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MISMATCH: THE MISUSE OF MARKET EFFICIENCY IN 
MARKET MANIPULATION CLASS ACTIONS 
CHARLES R. KORSMo* 
ABSTRACT 
Plaintiffs commonly bring two distinct types of claims under 
section JO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: (1) claims of 
material misrepresentations or omissions, and (2) claims of trade-
based market manipulation. Despite the distinctive features of the 
two types of claims, courts have tended to treat them identically when 
applying the ''fraud on the market" doctrine. In particular, courts 
have required both types of plaintiffs to make identical showings that 
the relevant security was traded in an "efficient market" in order to 
gain a presumption of reliance. The reasons for requiring such a 
showing by plaintiffs in a misrepresentation case are, however, inap-
plicable in market manipulation cases. Plaintiffs alleging market 
manipulation should not be required to demonstrate an efficient 
market in order to benefit from the fraud on the market doctrine's 
presumption of reliance. If plaintiffs are made to make any showing 
at all, it should be a showing of loss causation. 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Edward Cheng, 
Robin Effron, James Fanto, Henry Hansmann, Roberta Karmel, Minor Myers, James Park, 
Roberta Romano, and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., for their helpful comments, and to Dean Joan 
Wexler for research support. All errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 2009, the SEC filed a civil complaint against eight 
participants in an alleged scheme to manipulate the prices of at 
least four "penny stocks"1-a scheme which allegedly netted the 
participants illicit profits of at least $6.2 million. 2 The allegations 
regarding one of the four companies, Asia Global Holdings Corpora-
tion, are representative. Asia Global shares trade over-the-counter, 3 
and traded for around $0.11 per share in August of 2006, just prior 
to the manipulation. 4 Average trading volume was extremely light, 
with only a few hundred thousand shares-less than $100,000 
worth-changing hands in a typical trading week. 5 On August 9, 
2009, the manipulators sprang into action and began to engage in 
massive "wash sales, matched orders, and other manipulative 
trading, to give the market the false impression that there was real 
demand for these securities."6 Trading volume jumped to more than 
ten million shares per week, and the share price jumped to an 
intraday high of $0.41 on August 25.7 Between August 30 and 
September 5, a week during which trading volume peaked at more 
than forty million shares,8 the manipulators dumped nearly eight 
million shares into the wave of demand, netting approximately $1.3 
million.9 By December of 2006, Asia Global stock was selling below 
1. A penny stock is one with a price under $5 per share, usually trading in an over-the-
counter market. For a full definition, see SEC Rule 3a51-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-1 (2010). 
2. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Dynkowski, No. 1-09-CV-00361-GMS, 2009 WL 2491686 
(D. Del. May 20, 2009). Although the allegations are still mere allegations at this point, they 
will be treated here as if they are true, in order to avoid an unsightly "allegedly'' in every 
sentence. 
3. Jd. at 6. 
4. See Google Finance, Asia Global Holdings Corp. Historical Prices, 
http://www .google.com/finance/historical?q=OTC:AAGH (update date range to include August 
of 2006) (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
5. See id. 
6. Complaint, supra note 2, at 2, 12. 'Wash sales" are securities transactions in which 
there is no change in actual, beneficial ownership, whereas "matched orders" are offsetting 
purchases and sales entered into by a single party or by members of a pool. See infra notes 
31-32 and accompanying text. 
7. Complaint, supra note 2, at 12; Google Finance, supra note 4. 
8. Google Finance, supra note 4. 
9. Complaint, supra note 2, at 12. 
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$0.05 per share, and it now trades at around $0.003 per share, with 
an average weekly volume of only a few hundred thousand shares. 10 
That these manipulations took place in small, thinly traded stocks-
far from the glare of Wall Street analysts and the financial press-is 
wholly predictable. To see why, one need only ask what conditions 
must be met for such a "trade-based" market manipulation to 
succeed. First and foremost, a would-be manipulator seeks to create 
a fraudulent price/volume "signal," giving other traders a mislead-
ing impression of increased demand for the stock and falsely 
suggesting that someone has uncovered important new information 
about the company. 
To do so, a manipulator seeks to create a noticeable "spike" in a 
stock's price-a spike that other traders, perhaps na1ve day traders 
searching for stocks with "momentum," will notice and then amplify 
through their own trading, allowing the manipulator to sell into the 
resulting wave at a profit. How can such a price spike be created? 
One potential way would be to buy enough shares all at once to 
overwhelm the readily available supply of sellers, forcing the price 
up through liquidity effects. 11 Even if this fails to create a price 
spike, it may still create a noticeable surge in the stock's trading 
volume-a surge that could convince other traders that someone has 
uncovered valuable new information, and lead them to adjust their 
estimate of the stock's value upward. 
Such a strategy is highly unlikely to be successful with a blue-
chip stock like Microsoft. Would a manipulator be able to create a 
price spike by overwhelming the readily available supply of 
Microsoft shares? More than fifty million shares of Microsoft stock 
change hands on an average day-well over $1 billion worth. 12 How 
many hundreds of millions, or billions, of dollars would need to be 
put at risk for manipulative buying to stand out in this torrent of 
trading? Even if the manipulator is able to stand out, how likely is 
it that the sophisticated arbitrageurs following Microsoft will be 
fooled into thinking the "signal" is the result of new material infor-
10. Google Finance, supra note 4. 
11. This possibility is discussed in more detail with other potential mechanisms of 
manipulation. See infra Part II.C.l. 
12. See Yahoo! Finance, Microsoft Corp., http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=msft (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2011). 
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mation about a company covered relentlessly by the press and 
hundreds of professional security analysts? 
The natural targets for trade-based manipulations are not blue-
chip stocks like Microsoft-the chances of success are too remote, 
the financial risk too ruinous. The natural targets are cow-chip 
stocks like Asia GlobaJ.l3 A relatively modest buying spree could 
easily cause a noticeable spike in price and trading volume, which 
in turn could attract momentum traders and stimulate a wave of 
buying. Furthermore, it will seem far more plausible to the penny 
stock traders that the manipulative trading activity signals the 
presence of new material information about a less closely followed 
company. 
Thus, that the manipulations alleged by the SEC in its May 20, 
2009, complaint took place in penny stocks is entirely unsurprising. 
What may seem surprising, however, is that no follow-up class 
actions have been filed by injured shareholders. It may be that the 
amounts at stake are too small to attract litigation. But it may also -
be for another reason--one having little to do with economics and 
everything to do with the legal rules governing class actions alleging 
market manipulations. Due to a doctrinal flaw, shareholders of Asia 
Global would almost certainly be unable to achieve class certifica-
tion, no matter how compelling their allegations of manipulation. 
Conversely-and perversely-shareholders of Microsoft would face 
few difficulties in certifying a similar class, and thus obtaining 
leverage for a settlement, no matter how implausible their allega-
tions of manipulation. The sources of this curious result-and a sug-
gestion for remedying it-are the subject of this Article. 
The problem finds its root in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the landmark 
case in which the Supreme Court adopted the "fraud on the market" 
(FOTM) doctrine, 14 allowing plaintiffs in Rule lOb-515 securities 
fraud claims a presumption of reliance in class action cases 
involving transactions in open and developed securities markets. 16 
13. One survey of SEC enforcement actions from 1990 to 2001 found that "most 
manipulation cases happen in relatively inefficient markets, such as the OTC Bulletin Board 
and the Pink Sheets, that are small and illiquid." Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Guojun Wu, Stocll 
Market Manipulations, 79 J. Bus. 1915, 1917 (2006). 
14. 485 u.s. 224 (1988). 
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
16. As will be discussed in Part I.B, the basic intuition of the FOTM doctrine is that the 
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Prior to the acceptance of the FOTM doctrine, the need to show 
individual reliance served as a virtually insurmountable barrier to 
class certification in 10b-5 cases. 17 In order to gain this presumption 
of reliance, however, the Court required plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that the relevant security traded in an "efficient market."18 Though 
sometimes criticized and often inconsistently applied by lower 
courts, requiring plaintiffs to show market efficiency has, since 
Basic, served as one of the primary gatekeeping requirements for 
class certification-a role that takes on added significance in a 
world where securities lawsuits are virtually always settled once a 
class has been certified.19 In arguing the logic and necessity of the 
requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate an "efficient market," 
however, courts and commentators have focused on the kind of 
claims at issue in Basic-allegations of material misrepresentations 
or omissions affecting the market price of a security ("misrepresen-
tation claims"). At the same time, they have largely ignored the 
other common type of claim under section lO(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934-allegations of the kind of trade-based 
manipulative schemes discussed above ("manipulation claims" or 
"market manipulation claims").20 Allegations of market manipula-
tion have been lumped together with more straightforward allega-
"market" itself can fall victim to a misrepresentation, affecting the market price of a security. 
The individual investor may never hear of the misrepresentation but still be injured by 
trading in reliance on the integrity of the market price. Thus, the fraud itself is "on the 
market," and actual investors are injured by trading in reliance on the defrauded market. 
17. See, e.g., Cannon v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 
Reynolds v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566, 567-69 (D. Utah 1970), aff'd sub nom. 
Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (lOth Cir. 1971). The difficulty existed for two 
distinct reasons. First, as a matter of fact, most ordinary investors may not have read the 
relevant documents, or otherwise have seen or heard the alleged misrepresentations. Second, 
the need to show which of the plaintiffs did, in fact, hear about and rely on the alleged 
misrepresentations would cause individual issues to predominate, making class certification 
inappropriate. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (recognizing that individualized 
proof of reliance effectively makes it impossible to proceed as a class because "individual 
issues then would ... overwhelm[] the common ones"). 
18. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. 
19. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 97, 99 (2009) ("With vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the litigation 
on a path toward resolution by way of settlement, not full-fledged testing of the plaintiffs' case 
by trial."). 
20. See infra Part II (discussing market manipulation). 
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tions of misrepresentations and treated, without analysis, as if they 
were interchangeable for the purposes of FOTM analysis. 
In particular, plaintiffs alleging market manipulation have been 
required to make the same showing of market efficiency as plaintiffs 
alleging misrepresentations in order to invoke the FOTM doctrine 
and gain the benefit of a presumption of reliance. In misrepresenta-
tion cases, market efficiency serves a clear purpose: forging a causal 
chain between the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiffs 
loss. In an efficient market, it is reasonable for the plaintiff to rely 
on the market price, and any material misrepresentation will be 
quickly and accurately reflected in that price.21 Thus, the plaintiff 
can be said to have indirectly relied on the misrepresentation.22 This 
analysis, however, is turned on its head in cases involved trade-
based manipulative schemes. Such schemes are more likely to have 
a significant effect on prices in inefficient markets and are unlikely 
to succeed in efficient markets.23 In such cases, market efficiency is 
likely to sever any causal connection. Nonetheless, both types of 
claims have been treated identically for FOTM purposes.24 
Although this failure to distinguish between the two kinds of 
lO(b) claims has long created the potential for perverse results, it 
has finally bloomed into the kind of doctrinal confusion on display 
in In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation25 and-most 
21. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. 
22. Id. 
23. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
24. "Although generally discussed in terms of misrepresentations, the reasoning [of 
FOTM] applies equally to instances of alleged market manipulation or other schemes to 
defraud. To obtain the benefit of this presumption, plaintiffs first must allege that the 
relevant market was open and developed or, in other words, efficient." In re Parmalat Sec. 
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citation omitted); see also In re Citigroup 
Auction Rate Sec. Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re HiEnergy Techs., Inc. 
Sec. Litig., No. SACV04-122600C, 2005 WL 3071250, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2005); 4 ALAN 
R. BROMBERG & LEWJS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & 
COMMODITIES FRAUD§ 7:469 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Basic 
made no distinction between the clauses of Rule 10b-5). 
25. The nearly decade-long saga of In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation 
generated four published opinions of interest. The first, In re Initial Pubic Offering Securities 
Litigation (IPO 1), 241 F. Supp. 2d 281,297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), denied the defendants' motion 
to dismiss the original complaint. The second, In re Initial Public Offering Securities 
Litigation (IPO II), 227 F.R.D. 65, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), granted the plaintiffs class 
certification in six focus cases. The third, In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation 
(IPO III), 471 F.3d 24, 45 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated the class certification. The fourth, In re 
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recently and most pointedly-in the recent Ninth Circuit opinion 
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Ltd. 26 In both cases, complaints 
of market manipulation foundered at the class certification stage for 
inability to establish market efficiency. 
This Article endeavors to provide what the existing case law and 
academic literature sorely lacks-a principled examination of how 
the FOTM doctrine should be applied in the context of market 
manipulation claims. Part I gives a brief introduction to lOb-5 
litigation and how it differs from common law fraud actions, and 
provides an overview of the FOTM doctrine, showing that the Basic 
Court adopted a form of the doctrine giving plaintiffs a double 
presumption--of reliance and loss causation--once they establish an 
efficient market. 
Part II analyzes the concept of market manipulation. It discusses 
the various types of potential manipulative schemes and the 
contexts in which they are most likely to succeed, and concludes-as 
is suggested above-that manipulative schemes are most likely to 
have an effect on share prices in undeveloped, inefficient markets. 
Parts III through V form the analytical core of the Article. Part 
III asks whether the reasons for requiring a showing of market 
efficiency are applicable in market manipulation cases, and finds 
that they are not. Indeed, because manipulations are most likely to 
succeed in inefficient markets, a requirement of market efficiency 
has the perverse effect of screening out the most plausible claims of 
market manipulation while allowing the most dubious lawsuits to 
proceed. Part III concludes by arguing-in a sharp departure from 
current law-that a showing of market efficiency should not be 
required in market manipulation cases. Part IV discusses several 
real-life examples of post-Basic lOb-5 actions alleging manipulative 
schemes and shows how courts have required plaintiffs in such 
cases to make the same showing of market efficiency required in 
misrepresentation cases. 
Part V canvasses potential solutions to the problem identified 
here and concludes that, although the requirement that plaintiffs 
demonstrate market efficiency should be abolished, some gate-
Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation (IPO IV), 544 F. Supp. 2d 277, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008), denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. 
26. 573 F.3d 931, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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keeping requirement at the class certification stage would be 
appropriate, particularly in light of the fact that class certification 
in section 10(b) cases nearly always leads to settlement before trial. 
To create a logical gatekeeper, the requirement that plaintiffs show 
market efficiency should be replaced with a requirement that 
plaintiffs make a preliminary showing ofloss causation at the class 
certification stage. A showing ofloss causation would (1) provide the 
requisite causal connection between the plaintiffs' reliance on the 
integrity of the market and the manipulative conduct; (2) focus 
attention on the crucial question in any manipulation suit-whether 
the alleged manipulation distorted the market price; and (3) not 
require any action from Congress or the overruling of any Supreme 
Court precedent. 
I. 10B-5 ACTIONS AND THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET DOCTRINE 
A. Origins of the 1 Ob-5 Action 
In an effort to restore investor confidence in the wake of the 
market crash of 1929, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 
(1933 Act),27 creating an elaborate system of registration and 
disclosure of material information to investors.28 The next year, 
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 
Act),29 which sought to address the problem of stock market 
manipulation. 30 The 1934 Act forbids various "manipulative" trading 
27. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)). 
28. ld.; see also RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 112 (8th ed. 1998). 
29. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo). 
30. Section 2 of the 1934 Act declares that "[n]ational emergencies, ... which burden 
interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, 
and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices." 
15 U.S. C. § 78b(4). Popular imagination assigned a great deal of blame for the economic 
catastrophe to the so-called "stock pools"-nefarious corporate insiders, banks, and 
speculators who allegedly combined to manipulate the stock market, causing wild gyrations 
in security prices. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 
J. FIN. ECON. 343, 344 (1999) ("The purpose of the pools, the Senate concluded, was to 
manipulate the price of the chosen stock upward through the pool's purchases, then to sell the 
overpriced stock prior to the inevitable price decline."); Norman S. Poser, Stock Market 
Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671 (1986). 
Registration and disclosure, however, would be insufficient to stop the widespread 
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practices, such as wash sales31 and matched orders,32 which could 
potentially be used to create a false impression of heightened 
trading activity and fool ordinary investors into entering the 
market. 
In the same vein, the 1934Act also contains a broader prohibition 
on trading in a security "for the purpose of inducing the purchase or 
sale of such security by others."33 Such trading-running up the 
price of a stock in an attempt to excite ordinary investors into 
buying-was thought to be characteristic of manipulative "stock 
pools" prior to the crash, 34 and the prohibition of such activities was 
said to be "the very heart" of the securities acts. 35 For reasons that 
will soon become clear, it would have behooved Congress to main-
tain a clean distinction between market manipulation, on the one 
hand, and fraud, through false disclosure or nondisclosure, on the 
other. Instead, section 10(b) of the 1934 Ace6 serves as a catchall 
provision making it "unlawful for any person" to "use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance" in violation of rules 
promulgated by the SEC.37 The SEC duly promulgated Rule 10b-5, 
titled "Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices by 
brokers or dealers,"38 which lumps together into a brief, all-encom-
passing rule the prohibitions on market manipulation and on 
material misrepresentations or omissions, categorizing them all as 
manipulation thought to be at the root of the stock market collapse. For a detailed discussion 
of the legislative history of the 1934 Act, including the concern about market manipulation, 
see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 385 (1990). 
31. 15 U.S. C.§ 78i(a)(1)(A). 
32. ld. § 78i(a)(1)(B),(C). 
33. ld. § 78i(a)(2). 
34. Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 1 O(b): Securities Prices and the 
Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 359, 409-11. 
35. LoUIS LOSS, FuNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 853 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter 
Loss, FuNDAMENTALS) (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 
77TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON PROPOSALS FOR 
AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, 
at 50 (Comm. Print 1941)). 
36. 15 u.s.c. § 78j. 
37. ld. 
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
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species of "fraud" or "deceit."39 Not surprisingly, such a spare stat-
utory and regulatory framework, stretched over a vast expanse of 
potential activities, has yielded a somewhat common-law-style 
interpretive approach bycourts.4° First, although neither Rule lOb-5 
nor the underlying statutes explicitly create a private cause of 
action, courts have been routinely recognizing an implied cause of 
action for more than sixty years.41 Most importantly for present 
purposes, courts have-in the absence of any controlling statutory 
language to guide them- invoked common law tort principles to 
draw the contours of this private cause of action.42 Just as Congress 
I d. 
39. Rule 10b-5 reads, in its entirety: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which. operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security. 
40. See Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908, 
910-11 (1992) (suggesting that, because courts have essentially created a new federal tort 
from Rule 10b-5, "one should not be shocked to see them invoking Erie-resistant federal 
common law in order to invent appropriate qualifications of the new tort"); see also Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("When we deal with private actions 
under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a 
legislative acorn."). 
41. The first court to recognize a private cause of action under 10b-5 was apparently the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 
1946) ("[T]he mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to 
negative what the general law implies."). Within five years, Louis Loss could say that the 
Kardon court's recognition of an implied cause of action "has ... been followed in almost two 
score other cases" and "[n]o judge has expressed himself to the contrary." LOUIS LOSS, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 1049-50 (1951) [hereinafter LOSS, REGULATION]. The Supreme Court 
ultimately recognized an implied private cause of action without discussion in Superintendent 
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), and by 1983 described 
its existence as ''beyond peradventure." Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 
(1983); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988) ("Judicial interpretation 
and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any doubt 
that a private cause of action exists for a violation of§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and constitutes 
an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act's requirements."). 
42. See Loss, supra note 40, at 910 ("In the common law tradition, the courts have read 
into rule 10b-5 not only scienter, but also the additional elements of justifiable reliance and 
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did not maintain a distinction between market manipulation and 
fraud, so, too, the courts did not distinguish between the two types 
of claims. Instead, the elements for alllOb-5 claims were derived by 
analogy to the common law tort of fraud. 43 As a result, in addition 
to the requirements of scienter and materiality, courts have also 
required showings of justifiable reliance44 and loss causation. 45 
Though treated as separate elements in common law fraud cases-
and, traditionally, in lOb-5 cases-reliance and loss causation are 
both relevant to the question of whether the defendant's fraud can 
be considered an actual "cause" of any injury to the plaintiff. As 
such, the requirement of actual, justifiable reliance is often styled 
"transaction ca:usation,"46 and asks whether the defendant's fraud 
caused the plaintiff to enter into the relevant transaction in the first 
place. 47 This requirement is distinct from the element of ''loss 
causation," which, in a lOb-5 case, asks whether the defendant's 
conduct had a market impact that caused harm to the plaintiff.48 In 
a common law fraud case, satisfaction of the reliance element shows 
the causal connection between the fraud and the transaction, 
causation. It should come as no surprise ... that the courts have added flesh to the bare bones 
of 10b-5."). 
43. See Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking "Efficient Markets" Out of the Fraud-on-the-
Market Doctrine After the Priuate Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 
1003 (2003) ("Derived primarily from the common law of fraud, the basic elements of a Rule 
10b-5 cause of action have become materiality, scienter, reliance, and loss causation.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
44. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976). 
45. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props. Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997). The term 
"loss causation" is a fraught one. In common law deceit, the alleged harm to the plaintiff is 
usually manifest, and "loss causation" usually functions simply to ensure that the fraud was 
the proximate or "legal" cause of the harm. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 
(2005). Thus, if the plaintiff were fraudulently induced to enter into a contract and was hit 
by a bus on the way home from signing the contract, loss causation would not be established. 
Many early securities law cases echoed this notion of proximate causation in defining ''loss 
causation." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1999) (collecting cases). More 
recently, courts have held the loss causation requirement to mean more in the 10b-5 
context-namely, that plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentation or 
manipulation had a market impact that caused them harm. See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 345. 
This latter sense is the sense in which this Article uses the term. 
46. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341. 
47. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 728 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 
1984). 
48. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 345; Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1447; see also IX LOUIS Loss & 
JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4405-07 (3d ed. 1992). 
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whereas satisfaction ofthe loss causation element shows the causal 
connection between the transaction and the injury to the plaintiff. 
Together, they work to demonstrate the causal connection between 
the fraud and the injury to the plaintiff.49 
Prior to the adoption of the FOTM doctrine, the reliance-that is, 
transaction causation-element in a typical lOb-5 claim required 
each plaintiff to show that he or she decided to buy or sell the 
relevant security in reliance upon the defendant's alleged fraud. 50 At 
the same time, loss causation was a more generalized question of 
whether the plaintiff "would not have suffered a loss if the facts 
were what he believed them to be," because the stock would not 
have fallen in value, thus injuring the shareholders. 51 
B. The Fraud on the Market Doctrine 
Although the general outlines of the lOb-5 action were borrowed 
by analogy from the common law tort offraud, there are significant 
differences between face-to-face bargaining for real goods-the con-
text in which the common law tort of fraud developed-and trans-
actions on modern securities markets. 52 Courts have occasionally 
49. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 
811 (1965) ("The reason for [the reliance] requirement ... is to certify that the conduct of the 
defendant actually caused the plaintiffs injury." (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS§ 546 
(1938))). One might wonder why transaction causation is necessary, even in the context of real 
goods. Why should loss causation alone not be sufficient? After all, we may think a buyer is 
"injured" in some sense if she receives a good that is of less value to her than she was led to 
believe, even if she would have still purchased it had she known the truth. Say, for example, 
a good is being sold for $5, and the buyer's subjective utility from buying the good is actually 
$6. Because of the seller's misrepresentation, however, the buyer believes the good's 
subjective utility to her is $10. The law refuses to recognize this $4 difference as a com-
pensable harm to the plaintiff because the plaintiff still benefits from the transaction-the 
subjective utility of the real good she obtained was greater than the price she paid. As will be 
explored below, this reasoning is inapplicable to purchases of financial goods. 
50. Prior to Basic, the Supreme Court had already created exceptions to the general rule 
of actual, justifiable reliance. Perhaps the most noteworthy exception is that plaintiffs need 
not demonstrate reliance in 10b-5 cases involving material omissions. Affiliated Ute Citizens 
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972). In such cases, the notion of reliance is nec-
essarily hypothetical, so the Court held that proof of materiality-that a reasonable investor 
would have considered the information withheld to be important to the investment 
decision-can also function to establish a presumption of reliance. Id. at 153-54. 
51. LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1988). 
52. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1971) ("[T]he 
typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and deceit evolved was 
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been forced to adapt the elements of fraud to cope with these 
differences. 53 Perhaps the most controversial of these "adaptations" 
has been the adoption of the FOTM doctrine. 
1. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Fraud on the Market 
Doctrine 
Prior to the adoption of the FOTM doctrine, the requirement of 
individual reliance served as a barrier to class certification in 10b-5 
cases.54 As early as 1967, a treatise suggested that such a require-
ment was both impractical and theoretically unnecessary in cases 
of misrepresentations involving open-market transactions,55 and 
argued that "a 10b-5 reliance requirement in open market transac-
tions could be satisfied by showing that an investor who traded with 
reference to market price and conditions could be treated as 
indirectly relying on a misrepresentation which affected the 
market."56 Early courts adopting the FOTM theory embraced this 
story of indirect reliance-the misrepresentation is heard and relied 
upon by some market participants, thus affecting the price in a 
light years away from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule 10b-5 is 
applicable."). Echoing this sentiment, Barbara Black has noted that "today's rule 10b-5 claim 
alleging fraud on a large scale has moved light-years away from the common-law tort." 
Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements 
in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 454 (1984). At least as early as the 
1960s-even before the efficient capital market hypothesis had begun to permeate legal 
academia-legal commentators began to argue that common law fraud doctrines were not 
always a clean fit for transactions in modern, developed securities markets. See, e.g., Note, 
Civil Liability Under Section 1 Ob and Rule JOb-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of 
Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658, 670 (1965). 
53. See Loss, REGULATION, supra note 41, at 817 ("[T]he courts have repeatedly said that 
the fraud provisions in the SEC statutes are not limited to circumstances which would give 
rise to a common-law action for deceit."); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions 
Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 585 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Reliance 
Requirement] ("[T]he courts have gone beyond the common law in defining the nature, scope, 
and requirements of the federal action under rule 10b-5."). 
54. See supra note 17. 
55. See Oldham, supra note 43, at 1006-07. 
56. BROMBERG & LoWENFELS, supra note 24, § 7:468; see also Daniel R. Fischel, Use of 
Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 
Bus. LAW. 1, 9 (1982). 
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measurable way, and the plaintiff then reasonably relies on the 
price set by the market. 57 
This vision of indirect reliance suggested two possible approaches 
to the FOTM presumption. First, courts could presume only that the 
plaintiff reasonably relied on the market price and still require the 
plaintiff to demonstrate loss causation-that "the market price was 
in fact artificially affected by false information"58-in order to 
connect reliance on the market to the underlying misrepresentation. 
Alternatively, courts could presume both reasonable reliance and 
loss causation-that is market impact-as long as the plaintiff can 
establish that the alleged misrepresentation was "material."59 As 
the first circuit court to recognize the FOTM theory explicitly, the 
Ninth Circuit made clear that it was adopting the second of these 
approaches. 60 In the years prior to Basic, other circuit courts 
followed suit.61 Thus, allegations of a "material" misrepresentation 
would suffice to forge both links in the chain of indirect reliance: 
(1) a change in market price due to some market participants' 
57. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[An investor] relies 
generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected 
manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the 
representations underlying the stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays 
reflects material misrepresentations."). Do not read too much into the court's use of the term 
"manipulation"-the term is not being used in the specific sense reserved for it in this Article. 
58. Fischel, supra note 56, at 13. 
59. Courts will consider information material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making the investment decision. TSC 
Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The intuition underlying this second 
approach is that when there is "proof that the deception was material ... [there] is persuasive 
circumstantial evidence that a sufficient number of traders in the market did indeed rely." 
Note, Reliance Requirement, supra note 53, at 593. The logic is that if the plaintiffs can 
establish materiality-that is, a reasonable investor would have found the misrepresentation 
important-then it is safe to assume that the misrepresentation actually affected the market 
price. Thus, reliance on the market price can be presumed to be indirect reliance on the 
misrepresentation. 
60. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906 (stating that "causation is adequately established in the 
impersonal stock exchange context by proof of purchase and of the materiality of [the alleged] 
representations," and that "[m]ateriality circumstantially establishes the reliance of some 
market traders"). The Blackie court also held that the FOTM presumption could be rebutted 
if the defendant showed either (1) that the particular plaintiff did not actually rely on the 
misrepresentation-no reliance; or (2) that an insufficient number of traders actually relied 
on it to cause a change in the stock price-no loss causation. ld. As we will see, the Basic 
Court adopted a very similar rebuttable presumption. 
61. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986); Panzirerv. Wolf, 663 F.2d 
365, 367 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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reliance on the material misrepresentation, and (2) the plaintiffs' 
reasonable reliance on this altered market price. 
In addition to its important practical advantages for courts, 62 this 
"double-presumption" approach to the FOTM theory was given a 
crucial theoretical boost in 1982 when Daniel Fischel made the 
connection between the FOTM theory and the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis (ECMH). 63 Fischel described an efficient capital 
market as "one in which the price of stock at a given time is the best 
estimate of what the price will be in the future."64 In practice, when 
the current price of a stock is the best estimate of the future price 
of the stock, it means that the price reflects all available "informa-
tion" about that stock.65 The ECMH allowed Fischel to do two 
62. This "double-presumption" approach allows courts to avoid addressing the question 
of loss causation-whether, in fact, the misrepresentation had a measurable effect on the 
stock price-a question that is often hopelessly entangled with the merits of the lawsuit. By 
allowing materiality to suffice at the class certification stage, courts are able to certify classes 
while putting off potentially difficult, fact-intensive questions of loss causation until it is 
necessary to calculate damages, which is unlikely to ever be the case, given the prevalence of 
settlement upon class certification. See Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99. 
63. Fischel, supra note 56, at 9-10. Although a district court, In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 
F.R.D. 134, 142-46 (N.D. Tex. 1980), and several other commentators, Michael A. Lynn, Note, 
Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recouery Under SEC Rule 1 Ob-5, 50 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 627, 647-52 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 
1154-56 (1982), also recognized the potential relationship between the FOTM theory and the 
ECMH, Fischel's article proved to be a watershed. 
64. Fischel, supra note 56, at 4 n.9. To put it in the language of statistics, the price of a 
stock in an efficient market is a martingale. 
65. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, A Reuiew of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970). In principle, the ECMH can come in three forms-weak, 
semi-strong, and strong-depending on the type of "information" that can be considered as 
"fully reflected" in the price of the stock. Id. at 383-84. Weak form efficiency implies that 
prices fully reflect any information contained in the past movement of the stock price itself. 
Id. at 388. Thus, "an investor cannot enhance his/her ability to select stocks by knowing the 
history of successive prices and the results of analyzing them all possible ways." JAMES H. 
LORIE, PETER DODD & MARY HAMILTON KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND 
EVIDENCE 56 (2d ed. 1985). Weak form efficiency is also known as the "random walk" 
hypothesis, because it suggests that successive price movements are independent of each 
other and thus will appear random. Fama, supra, at 386-87. Semi-strong form implies that 
prices fully reflect any information that is publicly available and quickly adjust to reflect any 
new publicly available information-including potential fraudulent misrepresentations. ld. 
at 388. At its limit, this suggests "that efforts to acquire and analyze [public] knowledge 
cannot be expected to produce superior investment results." LORIE, DODD & KIMPTON, supra, 
at 56. Strong form implies that even nonpublic information-information known to any 
market participant-will be fully and quickly reflected in the price. Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market 
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things. First, it allowed him to say that it is perfectly reasonable for 
individual investors to rely on the market price in efficient 
markets-indeed, it would be irrational for them to do otherwise.66 
Because information-including misrepresentations-in prospec-
tuses, earnings reports, press releases, and other types of corporate 
disclosures will already be reflected in the market price, there is no 
reason investors should read them, or that the law should encourage 
them to do so. In fact, "investors would be wasting their money by 
doing so."67 Second, the ECMH allowed Fischel to put a more scien-
tific gloss on the Ninth Circuit's intuition that "[m]ateriality circum-
stantially establishes the reliance of some market traders," and that 
the reliance of some market traders would affect the price, thereby 
establishing loss causation.68 If the semi-strong form of the ECMH 
is accepted, 69 all new public material information-including mis-
representations-will by definition rapidly be reflected in the stock 
price.70 The invocation of the ECMH in support of the FOTM 
doctrine cements the Ninth Circuit's "double presumption" approach 
17teory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1077 (1990). 
With certain caveats, empirical studies have tended to confirm the weak and semi-strong 
form versions of the ECMH. See, e.g., West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 
2002) ("[F]ew propositions in economics are better established than the quick adjustment of 
securities prices to public information."); LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. at 144 ("[T]ests of market 
efficiency show that stock prices adjusted quickly to public announcements concerning the 
company: the 'collective action of a sufficient number of market participants buying or selling 
the stock causes a very rapid, if not virtually instantaneous, adjustment in price."'). 
66. Fischel, supra note 56, at 4 ("Because the market price itself transmits .all available 
information, investors have no incentive to study other available data."). 
67. Id. As a result-and this is sometimes forgotten-Fischel did not merely argue that 
reliance should be presumed in cases involving efficient markets, he argued that "[t]he logic 
of the fraud on the market theory dictates that the reliance requirement as conventionally 
interpreted be discarded altogether." Id. at 11. 
68. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975). 
69. See supra note 65. 
70. Again, Fischel went beyond endorsing the notion in Blackie that allegations oflegally 
"materiaf' misrepresentations should suffice to create a presumption of loss causation. See 
Fischel, supra note 56, at 7. One of the main thrusts of his article was that, in an efficient 
market, abstract legal definitions of "materiality" are unnecessary and probably 
counterproductive-it is the absence or presence of a price reaction that tells us whether 
information really is new and material. Id. According to Fischel, acceptance of the FOTM 
theory, as viewed in light of the ECMH, means "that there is no need in a securities fraud 
case for separate inquiries into materiality, reliance, causation, and damages." Id. at 13. The 
only inquiry "in open-market transactions should be whether the market price was in fact 
artificially affected by false information." Id. 
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as the logical approach. 71 The ECMH supports the picture of indirect 
reliance and strengthens both links in the resulting chain of 
causation.72 Notably for our purposes, though courts and commenta-
tors tended to speak of "10b-5 actions"· in general, the theory 
underpinning the FOTM doctrine was developed with fraudulent 
misrepresentations in mind, with little or no attention paid to how, 
if at all, the theory should apply in the context of market manipula-
tions.73 
2. Basic Inc. v. Levinson 
The Supreme Court finally took up the question of the FOTM 
doctrine in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The facts of Basic are well-known. 
During 1977 and 1978, "Basic made three public statements 
denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations."74 In December 
of 1978, however, another company purchased Basic. Former share-
71. One need not accept Fischel's invitation to drastically reimagine the 10b-5 action to 
come to this conclusion. As is detailed in Part I.A.2, the Supreme Court rejected Fischel's 
invitation but embraced the FOTM doctrine and the double presumption. In part, the Court's 
rejection of Fischel's solution may have stemmed from judicial conservatism-after decades 
oftreating 10b-5 actions as analogous to common law fraud, the Court may have thought such 
a radical change should come from Congress. In part, it may be because Fischel's approach 
would create a procedural quandary-should the key inquiry into "whether the market price 
was in fact artificially affected" take place before or after class certification? Fischel, supra 
note 56, at 13. Because this inquiry is seemingly determinative of the merits, it seems 
inappropriate to do it before class certification. But given that securities suits inevitably settle 
upon certification of a class, it seems likely that the inquiry would rarely take place at all if 
it were performed after class certification. Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99. Fischel did not 
address this problem. 
72. One lower court, writing after Basic, has summarized the role of the ECMH in the 
FOTM doctrine as follows: 
First, the efficient capital market hypothesis allows a court to assume that any 
material misrepresentation made by an issuer of securities will quickly and 
accurately be reflected in the market price of that issuer's securities, so long as 
the market involved is an "efficient" one. Next, it is presumed reasonable for an 
investor to rely on the integrity of the market price of any such security. And 
finally, because an investor who trades in a particular security can be presumed 
to have done so based on the market price of that security, if that market price 
reflects some misrepresentation made by the issuer of the security, the trader 
can be deemed to have relied on the misrepresentation itself. 
In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (citations omitted). 
73. Fischel's article does not mention market manipulations at all. See Fischel, supra note 
56. 
74. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227 (1988). 
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holders sued Basic and its board of directors, alleging that they 
violated section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 by falsely denying the 
existence of merger negotiations. 75 The plaintiffs sought to certify a 
class of investors who had sold their stock after the first denial of 
the merger negotiations but prior to the announcement of the 
merger. In certifying a class, the district court permitted a presump-
tion of reliance.76 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the presumption of 
reliance, relying on the FOTM theory and noting that Basic stock 
traded "in an impersonal, efficient market."77 The two questions 
before the Supreme Court were whether false denials of preliminary 
merger negotiations could be material, and whether a FOTM 
presumption of reliance was appropriate. 78 Mter determining that 
preliminary merger negotiations could be material/9 the Court took 
up the FOTM theory. As with prior commentary and cases, the 
Court analyzed the FOTM doctrine in the context of an alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentation-the plaintiffs did not allege any 
trade-based manipulations. Nor did the Court, in speaking of lOb-5 
actions, discriminate between fraudulent misrepresentations and 
market manipulations. 
As a first step, the Court recommitted itself to the proposition 
that "reliance is an element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action."80 Then, 
although denying that its holding required full acceptance of the 
ECMH,81 the Court did, in fact, implicitly adopt a form of the ECMH 
75. Id. at 227-28. 
76. Id. at 228. 
77. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 1986). 
78. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230. Interestingly, the Court did not address "whether companies 
have the freedom to hide preliminary merger negotiations from public scrutiny in order to 
make them more likely to come to fruition." Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: 
Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 156. "[W]hether and when securities 
law should permit issuers to lie in order to serve their shareholders" was the subject of "a 
lively debate" in the wake of Basic. Id. 
79. Basic, 485 U.S. at 239-41. 
80. Id. at 243. In doing so, the Court declined to follow Fischel's advice to dispense with 
the concept of reliance altogether in favor of an exclusive focus on loss causation through 
market impact. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. 
81. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n.24 ("We need not determine by adjudication what 
economists and social scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical 
analysis and the application of economic theory."); id. at 248 n.28 ("By accepting this 
rebuttable presumption, we do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular theory of how 
quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in market price."). 
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in justifying a presumption of reliance. 82 In particular, the Court 
held that a presumption of reliance was appropriate in cases 
involving "an open and developed securities market."83 Crucially, 
the Court's implicit acceptance of the principles underlying the 
ECMH led it to adopt the indirect reliance approach to the FOTM 
doctrine, with its double presumption ofloss causation and reliance. 
First, the Court noted that "[r]ecent empirical studies have tended 
to confirm ... that the market price of shares traded on well-
developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, 
hence, any material misrepresentations."84 The Court then went on 
to state that "[a]n investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by 
the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price."85 
Having forged the two links of the double presumption, the Court 
proceeded to join them by concluding that "[b]ecause most publicly 
available information is reflected in market price, an investor's 
reliance on any public material misrepresentations ... may be pre-
sumed for purposes of a Rule 1 Ob-5 action."86 Beyond the theoretical 
82. Id. at 246 n.24 ("For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, 
we need only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly announced 
material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices."). Justice White, 
in dissent, certainly believed that the Court had accepted the presumption based on the 
ECMH, and scholars have tended to agree with him. Id. at 250, 253-55 (White, J., dissenting); 
Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, Solving a Pro{otLnd Flaw in FratLd-on-the-Market 
Theory: Utilizing a Derivative of Arbitrage Pricing Theory To MeastLre RLLle 1 Ob-5 Damages, 
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (1997) ("The Court based its adoption of the fraud-on-the-
market theory on its implicit assumption of the validity of the principles underlying the 
ECMH .... Although the Court did not state its acceptance of the ECMH by name, the Court 
unmistakably stated its acceptance of the ECMH in substance."); Macey & Miller, stLpra note 
65, at 1077 ("Despite this disclaimer, the Court was adopting the semi-strong version of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis, whether it was aware it was doing so or not."). 
83. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42, 245-47. 
84. Id. at 246. 
85. Id. at 247. 
86. Id. That the Court adopted the double presumption is emphasized by the examples it 
gave for how the presumption may be rebutted. The Court provided three such examples. 
First, the defendant can show that "the 'market makers' were privy to the truth," which would 
demonstrate "that the market price would not have been affected by the[] 
misrepresentations," breaking the "causal connection." Id. at 248. Second, the defendant can 
show "truth" on the market-that "news" ofthe misrepresentation leaked out and "dissipated 
the effects of the misstatements," again breaking the connection. Id. at 248-49. Finally, the 
defendant could show that the individual plaintiff was not "relying on the integrity of the 
market," but "sold his shares nevertheless because of other unrelated concerns." Id. at 249. 
Thus, in keeping with the vision of indirect reliance, the defendant can rebut the FOTM 
presumption by showing either a lack of loss causation or a lack of reliance. 
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coherence of the FOTM doctrine in light of the ECMH, practical 
concerns of evidence and procedure also motivated the Court's 
conclusions. The Court emphasized that presumptions arise "out of 
considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as 
judicial economy," suggesting that a presumption of reliance may be 
preferable to requiring statutorily favored plaintiffs "to show a 
speculative state of facts" at such an early stage in the proceed-
ings.87 
3. Implementation by the Lower Courts-The Requirement of an 
"Efficient" Market 
The Supreme Court's official recognition of the FOTM presump-
tion led to an explosion of securities fraud litigation.88 No longer 
able to argue against the FOTM presumption in general, defendants 
at the crucial class certification stage seized upon the Court's 
87. I d. at 245. One scholar goes so far as to argue that "Basic cannot be understood except 
by appreciating that the Court's response is far more a lesson in civil procedure than financial 
economics." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 158. Even if this is an overstatement, it is clear the 
Court was alert to considerations of what kinds of evidence a plaintiff can and should be 
expected to present at class certification. Adopting the more sweeping double presumption 
avoided the need for a fact-intensive inquiry into loss causation at the class certification 
stage-an inquiry necessarily intertwined with the merits. 
88. The number of suits filed nearly tripled in the three years after Basic, and "continued 
to rise dramatically over the next fifteen years." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 179; see also 
Vincent E. O'Brien, The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991, at A20 
(counting section 11 actions as well). In light of this increase, Fischel's claim that "[i]n all 
probability" his approach would "decrease the overall amount of litigation under rule 10b-5" 
might strike the modern reader as almost touchingly na!ve. Fischel, supra note 56, at 16. In 
fairness to Fischel, the version of the FOTM theory adopted by the Court bears only a 
superficial resemblance to the theory he advocated. On the one hand, as noted above, the 
Court declined to eliminate the reliance requirement altogether. More importantly, the Court 
did not accept the notion that the absence or presence of a market reaction is the only real 
measure of the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation. Three years after Basic, in fact, 
the Court held that defendants could not avoid liability by arguing that market professionals 
had seen through a misrepresentation, thus preventing any impact on the market price. See 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991) (''If it would take a 
financial analyst to spot the [misrepresentation], whatever is misleading will remain 
materially so, and liability should follow."). This "notion that a statement can be materially 
misleading even if informed investors are not fooled (and accordingly price remains 
unchanged) is flatly inconsistent with the premises" underlying the FOTM theory, and shows 
that, for the Court, ''belie[£] in the informational content of prices ... is merely a one-way 
street." Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 
VA. L. REV. 623, 662 n.96 (1992). 
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language about "open and developed" markets, and began arguing 
that the market for the particular security at issue was not 
sufficiently efficient to support the presumption in the individual 
case.89 These arguments-together with the need for some 
gatekeeping requirement to staunch the flood of securities fraud 
suits-forced courts to formulate "tests" for the required level of 
efficiency. Demonstrating the requisite market efficiency quickly 
became one of the major hurdles for plaintiffs seeking to bring lOb-5 
class actions, and the question of market efficiency took on a 
significance that would not be immediately obvious from a casual 
reading of Basic's plurality opinion. Basic itself said little about how 
"efficient" the relevant market needed to be, or how such efficiency 
should be established. The lower courts were left to deal with those 
questions themselves.90 
Though lower courts have agreed that a showing of market 
efficiency is required to invoke the FOTM presumption, they have 
been inconsistent in their approach to determining whether a mar-
ket is sufficiently efficient.91 Among the earliest-and still probably 
89. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 166-68. 
90. Indeed, although Basic unmistakably reflected the Supreme Court's approval of the 
FOTM presumption of reliance, it provided relatively little guidance as to how lower courts 
should implement the doctrine. See Macey & Miller, supra note 65, at 1077. 
91. In Basic itself, the relevant stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and the Court apparently assumed an efficient market without further discussion. Basic, 485 
U.S. at 227-28, 247-50. Some lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead and 
assumed market efficiency when the relevant security trades on a major exchange like the 
NYSE or National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Transglobe Energy Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1369 (M.D. Fla. 1999) 
(finding, without analysis, that a stock listed on the NASDAQ and several Canadian 
exchanges traded in an efficient market); Levine v. Metal Recovery Techs., Inc., 182 F.R.D. 
102, 107-08 (D. Del. 1998) (finding, without analysis, that a stock listed on the NASDAQ 
Small Cap Market traded in an efficient market). Other courts have argued that market 
efficiency cannot be assumed based on the exchange on which a security is traded-it is the 
market for the individual security itself that must be efficient. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Appel, 165 
F.R.D. 479, 504 (W.D. Mich. 1996); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1281-83 (D.N.J. 
1989). Some courts have extended the FOTM presumption to initial public offerings (IPOs) 
and securities traded in over-the-counter markets. See, e.g., Endo v. Albertine, 863 F. Supp. 
708, 726 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (extending the FOTM presumption to IPOs); Cammer, 711 F. Supp. 
at 1297 (extending the FOTM presumption to securities traded in over-the-counter markets). 
But see IPO III, 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that "the market for IPO shares is not 
efficient"); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
"a primary market for newly issued municipal bonds as a matter of law is not efficient"). Still 
others have suggested that a slow market reaction to obscure news could call into question 
the efficiency of even heavily traded blue-chip stocks. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 
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most widely used-tests for market efficiency was a multi-factor test 
formulated by a New Jersey district court in Cammer v. Bloom.92 
The so-called "Cammer factors" have proved influential, with courts 
sometimes adding additional factors of their own.93 The result, as 
one scholar describes it, was "an ad hoc approach informed by expert 
testimony, but in fact largely unconstrained."94 
A related question is when the required showing should be made. 
Although Basic itself involved class certification, consensus was 
slow to materialize as to whether the FOTM presumption-and the 
associated inquiry into market efficiency-needed to be settled at 
that stage of the litigation. Courts were torn between the necessity 
of deciding the presumption of reliance in order to satisfy Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and the Supreme Court's admonishment 
against conducting fact-intensive, merits-related inquiries at the 
class certification stage. 95 In the past few years, however, a rough 
consensus has emerged that a district court must make a determi-
nation-prior to certifying a class-that each of the Rule 23 re-
quirements has been met, even if a Rule 23 requirement overlaps 
with a merits issue.96 Unlike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
F.3d 261, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that if Merck's common stock was slow to respond 
to confusing revenue data, it would demonstrate an inefficient market and thus be grounds 
for denial of class certification). 
92. The Cammer court set forth five factors that could be indicative of market efficiency: 
(1) average weekly trading volume, (2) number of securities analysts following the stock, 
(3) number of market makers and arbitrageurs, (4) status as an S-3 filer, and (5) respons-
iveness of the market price to "unexpected corporate events or financial releases." Cammer, 
711 F. Supp. at 1286-87. 
93. See, e.g., Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (considering 
additional factors, including market capitalization and bid-ask spread). 
94. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 167-68 ("[W]ading into the mind-numbing data 
defendants (and thus plaintiffs as well) often put forward in their expert reports creates the 
illusion that there is a bright-line distinction."); see also Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The "Less 
Than" Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-
on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN'SL. REV. 81, 83 (2004); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving 
Markets Inefficient: The Variability of Federal Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in 
Cammer v. Bloom and Its Progeny, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 303, 319-20 (2002). 
95. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974). 
96. See !PO III, 4 71 F.3d at 42; In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 
2005); Blades v. Monsanto, 400 F.3d 562,575 (8th Cir. 2005); Unger, 401 F.3d at 319; Gariety 
v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he factors spelled out in Rule 
23 must be addressed through findings, even if they overlap with issues on the merits."); 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A] judge should make 
whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23," even if "the judge must 
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12(b)(6), courts are required to make "factual findings" that all of 
the requirements for Rule 23 class certification are met. If the 
plaintiff seeks to invoke the FOTM presumption, the need to make 
such findings necessarily requires rigorous scrutiny of efficiency 
claims at the class certification stage, a fact-intensive inquiry that 
can entail lengthy discovery.97 
The net result is that district courts are required to perform a 
searching and relatively wide-ranging inquiry into market efficiency 
prior to class certification. In a world where concerns over the costs 
and efficacy of securities litigation are increasingly widespread, this 
inquiry has become one of the primary gatekeepers to class certi-
fication. 98 Indeed, given that the overwhelming majority of lOb-5 
actions settle upon certification of a class99-seemingly with little 
make a preliminary inquiry into the merits."). 
97. See, e.g., IPO III, 471 F.3d at 41-42; Unger, 401 F.3d at 322; Gariety, 368 F. 3d at 366. 
This trend toward increased scrutiny of market efficiency at the class certification has 
arguably been reinforced by two legal changes that were, at least in part, driven by concerns 
about the swarm of securities fraud class actions spawned by Basic: (1) the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) and (2) the 2003 amendments to Rule 23. The PSLRA, with 
its overt skepticism of securities class actions, cast doubt on the Basic Court's assumption 
that private class actions are a legislatively favored remedy for securities fraud, suggesting 
that greater judicial scrutiny would be appropriate. The initial bill, H.R. 10, was drafted by 
then-Congressman Christopher Cox and would have undone Basic altogether. See Common 
Sense Legal Reforms Act, H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 204 (1995). Ironically, in light of the fact that 
a stringent test for market efficiency became one of the primary roadblocks to class 
certification, the PSLRA's damages provision actually suggests congressional skepticism of 
the ECMH. See Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 894-
95 (1998); Oldham, supra note 43, at 1028-29; Michael Y. Scudder, Comment, The 
Implications of Market-Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 
435, 461 (1997). 
The 2003 amendments to Rule 23 made two relevant changes. First, they eliminated the 
provision from prior Rule 23(c)(1)(C) allowizi.g "conditional" certification of classes. FED. R. Crv. 
P. 23 advisory committee's note. Second, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was altered, replacing the 
requirement to certify a class "as soon as practicable" with an instruction to certify "at an 
early practicable time." Id. The advisory committee's notes state that "[a) court that is not 
satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they 
have been met," and instruct courts that "it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into 
the 'merits,' limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification decision on an 
informed basis." Id. 
98. See Douglas C. Conroy & Johanna S. Wilson, Class Actions-Evening the Playing 
Field: Stress- Testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 26, at 1127 
(June 26, 2006). 
99. See Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99. 
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regard for the merits100-the need for a gatekeeping requirement of 
some sort is manifest, and may help explain the recent consensus.101 
The question addressed in Part III is whether this particular gate-
keeping requirement has any logical force in cases alleging market 
manipulation, even if it is defensible for cases involving material 
misrepresentations. Before we can address this question, a better 
understanding of "market manipulation" is needed. 
II. MARKET MANIPULATION 
A. Defining Market Manipulation 
One of the main difficulties in talking and thinking about how to 
treat claims of market manipulation is the lack of an agreed-upon 
meaning for "market manipulation." Beyond banning wash sales 
and matched orders, the relevant statutes do not define the term, 
and courts have struggled to find a meaningful definition.102 Before 
the application of the FOTM doctrine to market manipulation 
claims can be examined, some common misunderstandings must be 
cleared away, and a plausible definition of manipulative conduct 
must be identified. 
The most obvious types of trade-based manipulations are the 
types of wash sales and matched orders alleged by the SEC in the 
case discussed in the Introduction. The potential class of "market 
manipulations," however, is broader than these economically 
fictitious transactions. Fischel and Ross make the most thorough 
and satisfying attempt to define this broader class of market 
manipulation. 103 In their analysis, they show that a meaningful 
100. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 596-97 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: 
Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 61, 79 n.40 (1991). 
101. See West v. Prudential Sec., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[V]ery few securities 
class actions are litigated to conclusion, so review [of the district court's interpretation of the 
FOTM] may be possible only through the Rule 23(f) device."). 
102. "[E]ven though both have the prevention of manipulation as a primary goal," neither 
the Securities Exchange Act nor the Commodity Exchange Act provides a definition of 
"market manipulation." Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit 
"Manipulation" in Financial Markets?, 105 HARv. L. REV. 503, 506 (1991); see also Loss, 
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 860 n. 75 ("[T]he word 'manipulative' as used in§§ lO(b) and 
15(c)(1) has never had any precise meaning."). 
103. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 506. 
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definition of manipulation involving real trades (as opposed to 
economically fictitious trades) must be subjective-that is, it must 
depend on the intent of the trader. 104 After rejecting attempts to 
define manipulation more broadly, 105 Fischel and Ross settle on a 
104. ld. at 510. See also ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 102 (2d Cir. 
2007) ("[I]n some cases scienter is the only factor that distinguishes legitimate trading from 
improper manipulation."). In fact, Fischel and Ross go on to conclude that wash sales and 
matched orders-the most obvious types of market manipulations-are better analyzed as a 
"species of fraud" than as a separate category of market manipulations. Fischel & Ross, supra 
note 102, at 510-12. Although this argument may have merit, it is uncomfortable doctrinally, 
as wash sales and matched orders are among the few potentially "manipulative" practices 
explicitly barred by the securities laws. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (2006). In any case, one need 
not go so far for the purposes of this Article. 
105. Specifically, Fischel and Ross reject attempts to define manipulation as conduct 
"designed to do one of three things: (1) interfere with the free play of supply and demand; (2) 
induce people to trade; or (3) force a security's price to an artificial level." Fischel & Ross, 
supra note 102, at 507. They reject the first formulation because the term "interfere" is 
"circular absent a definition of manipulation." I d. All trades and traders are a part of the "play 
of supply and demand." Id. A large investor who places a large order in the honest belief that 
the stock is a good investment will alter the supply and demand in the same fashion as one 
who places a large order for manipulative purposes. In attempting to define manipulation, the 
entire problem is to distinguish between demand that is in some sense "legitimate" and 
demand that is somehow "illegitimate." Without some definition of manipulation "that 
distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate demand, the concept of interference with 
supply and demand does not advance the inquiry." ld. 
Although acknowledging that "inducement of trading ... is sometimes said to be the essence 
of manipulation," Thel, supra note 34, at 410, Fischel and Ross reject this second formulation 
as ''hopelessly overbroad." Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 507. At one extreme, of course, 
every bid or offer is intended to induce someone to trade--the counterparty to the trade. ld. 
at 507-08. Clearly this cannot be what is meant. There are also many perfectly legitimate 
situations in which firms or individuals may act to induce trades by people other than 
counterparties. Most obviously, any time a firm discloses new information about the "value 
or riskiness" of the firm's securities, it is "likely [to]lead to increases in the volume of trading 
and thus can be said to have 'induced' trading." Id. at 508. Less obviously, a firm may 
purchase its own shares or change its capital structure, in part "as a way of communicating 
information about the value of its securities." ld. at 508 & n.27 (collecting sources). Similarly, 
prominent executives will often purchase shares in order to "signal confidence" in the 
prospects of the firm. See Eric Martin & Michael Tsang, lmmelt's GE Purchases Signal Sell 
as Insiders Buy, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aLCAhR7E5RJE (General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt's share purchase 
"'reflects his confidence in the company,' said Gary Sheffer, a spokesman for [GE]."). Such 
activities are not generally thought of as manipulative. 
The third formulation-forcing security prices to an artificiallevel-"has intuitive appeal 
because creation of artificial prices, unlike trading, is socially undesirable." Fischel & Ross, 
supra note 102, at 508. The problem with this formulation as an attempt to craft an 
"objective" definition of manipulative conduct-not depending on the intent of the trader-is 
the inability to determine whether a price level is "artificial." What is to distinguish between 
a manipulator and an investor who trades in the genuine belief that prices will move in a 
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definition focused on "profitable trades made with 'bad' intent"-
that is, trades where 
(1) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain 
direction; 
(2) the trader has no belief that the prices would move in 
this direction but for the trade; and 
(3) the resulting profit comes solely from the trader's 
ability to move prices and not from his possession of 
valuable information.106 
This definition-together with economically fictitious transactions 
like wash sales and matched orders-will be the definition of 
market manipulation used in this Article. 
B. Real-Life Examples of Alleged Market Manipulation 
The contours of this definition become clearer by examining real-
life examples of alleged market manipulation. Below are five cases 
involving alleged manipulation107-three criminal prosecutions 
given direction, but who proves to be mistaken, with prices ultimately moving in the other 
direction? "Trading based on a genuine belief that prices will ultimately move in the direction 
of the trades is the essence of nonmanipulative trading," but the third proposed formulation 
provides nothing to distinguish it from manipulation. ld. at 509. 
More subtly,"[ d]efining manipulation by reference to whether the trades move prices closer 
to their correct level" could threaten "property rights in information." ld. "[T]rades, as well 
as disclosures, can reveal information." ld. Just as share purchases by a firm's CEO can signal 
confidence based on the presumably superior information possessed by the CEO, trades by 
other investors can also signal the presence of new or superior information. Ronald J. Gilson 
& Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 572-79 
(1984). If trades were perfectly informative, however, it would destroy the ability of investors 
to profit from generating new information, imperiling the very mechanisms on which market 
efficiency depends. See id.; Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets 
Where Trades Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 585 (1976) ("The price system can be 
maintained only when it is noisy enough so that traders who collect information can hide that 
information from other traders."). In order to preserve incentives for investors to acquire 
information in the first place-and thus fulfill the information-generating function of 
markets-"[t]raders must be allowed to disguise their trades to avoid disclosing the 
information they possess to other traders." Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 509-10. A 
definition of market manipulation built around forcing prices to an artificial level would 
threaten the ability of traders to disguise their trades. 
106. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 510. 
107 · The actual facts and motivations in each of the examples are, of course, hotly disputed. 
Indeed, the conviction in United States v. Mulheren was ultimately overturned. 938 F.2d 364, 
372 (2d Cir. 1991). In lieu of inserting an unsightly "allegedly" into every clause, the 
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examined by Fischel and Ross, 108 and two recent, prominent lOb-5 
class actions. 109 
1. United States v. GAF Corporation 
In October of 1986, GAF Corporation was looking to sell a large 
block of the approximately ten million shares of Union Carbide it 
had acquired in an unsuccessful takeover attempt. 110 GAF desired 
to boost the market price of Union Carbide stock, in hopes of 
receiving a better price for its shares in a negotiated transaction 
pegged to the market price. 111 To do so, GAF asked Jeffries & Co., a 
broker-dealer, to make open-market purchases of Union Carbide 
stock to drive the closing price above $22 on October 29 and 30, "and 
guaranteed Jeffries & Co. against any loss."112 Jeffries & Co. pro-
ceeded to do so, 113 and on November 10, GAF sold five million shares 
in an off-market transaction-allegedly receiving $5 million more 
than it would have absent the manipulation. 114 
allegations of defendant conduct and motivation will be addressed as if they were true for 
each of the cases discussed. This is, of course, not necessarily the case. At this point, these 
cases are simply intended to give the reader tangible examples of manipulative conduct. The 
exact mechanism by which each of the following schemes was alleged to have affected 
prices-and by which the defendants were alleged to profit-is discussed in Part ILC. 
108. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364; United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, 
at 527-34. Although these three examples all led to criminal prosecutions, the types of 
manipulations alleged could easily support 10b-5 actions, as well. 
109. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); IPO I, 
241 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
110. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 527 & n.97 (citing Indictment, United States 
v. GAF Corp., No. 88 Cr. 962 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1988)); Stephen La baton, GAF Fined; Executive 
Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1990, at 31. 
111. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 527-28. 
112. Id. at 528. 
113. Jeffries & Co. purchased approximately 60,000 shares near the close of trading on 
October 29, and approximately 40,000 shares near the close of trading on October 30. Id. As 
a result, "Union Carbide closed at $22 ... on October 29," and at "$22-7/8 on the [NYSE] and 
$22-3/8 on the Pacific Stock Exchange" on October 30. Id. "Jeffries & Co. sold [these] shares 
on November 3 and 4 at a loss. On November 6 and 7, Jeffries & Co. purchased an additional 
20,500 shares shortly before the close of trading," selling them November 10-12 without loss. 
I d. 
114. Id. 
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2. United States v. Milken 
Wickes Corporation, an investment banking client of Michael 
Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert, had "approximately eight 
million shares of ... convertible exchangeable preferred stock" 
outstanding as of April of 1985.115 Wickes had an option to redeem 
the preferred shares at $2.50 at any time prior to May of 1988 if the 
closing price of Wickes common stock was at any point greater than 
or equal to $6-1/8 for at least twenty of thirty consecutive trading 
days.116 As of April22, 1986, 'Wickes common stock had closed at or 
above [this threshold] on nineteen out of twenty-eight consecutive 
trading days."117 Thus, a closing price at or above $6-118 on either of 
the next two trading days would allow Wickes to redeem the 
shares.118 
Seeking to make certain the necessary conditions were met, 
Milken asked Ivan Boesky's organization to purchase enough 
Wickes stock to ensure that it would close at $6-1/8, and guaranteed 
Boesky against any resulting trading losses. 119 During the last half 
hour of trading on April 23, 1986, Boesky's organization purchased 
1.9 million shares of Wickes stock, which it later sold at a loss. 120 
The stock closed at $6-118 on April 23, and Wickes redeemed the 
preferred shares on April29.121 Drexel Burnham Lambert received 
a $2.3 million underwriting fee for the redemption.122 
3. United States v. Mulheren 
In 1985, Ivan Boesky (again!) accumulated approximately 3.4 
million shares of Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. (G&W).123 Boesky 
entered into discussions with G&W's chairman about either taking 
115. ld. at 530 & n.121 (citing Indictment at 55-56, United States v. Milken (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(No. 89 Cr. 41)). 
116. ld. at 530. This kind of provision is similar to what is known as an "Asian option," and 
is often intended to reduce the risk of manipulation. 
117. ld. 
118. ld. 
119. ld. 
120. ld. 
121. ld. 
122. ld. 
123. United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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control of G& W or selling his shares back to the company at $45 per 
share. 124 On October 16, 1985, with the stock trading at $44-3/4, 
G&W's chairman expressed willingness to buy the shares back in a 
block transaction, but only at the prevailing price on the NYSE. 125 
The next morning, Boesky called John Mulheren, chief trader for 
Jamie Securities Co., and told him that he ''liked" G&W stock and 
that "it would be great if it traded at 45."126 Between 11:00 a.m. and 
11:10 a.m., Mulheren placed a combination of limit and market 
orders, 127 and at 11:17 a.m., Boesky successfully sold his 3.4 million 
shares back to G&W at the prevailing market price of $45 per 
share.128 The stock closed at $43-5/8, and Mulheren sold his shares 
at the end of the day at a loss. 129 
All three of the preceding cases meet our definition of manipula-
tion: (1) the trading was intended to boost the price above a certain 
level; (2) the defendants did not, apparently, believe the price would 
move in that direction absent the manipulative trades; and (3) the 
profits came from the negotiated off-market sales (in GAF and 
Mulheren) or underwriting fees (in Wickes). 
4. In re IPO Securities Litigation 
The manipulation alleged in In re Initial Public Offering Securi-
ties Litigation was both more systematic and less straightforward 
than in the cases discussed so far. 130 The underwriters of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) of hot tech companies during the dot-com 
bubble "conditioned allocations of shares at the offer price on 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 367. 
126. Id. 
127. Mulheren purchased a total of 75,000 shares of G&W stock at prices between $44-3/5 
and $45. Id. at 367-68. 
128. Id. at 366, 368. 
129. Id. at 368. 
130. In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation was a sprawling mass of thousands 
of individual securities class actions against 55 underwriters and 310 issuers in the wake of 
the dot-com collapse in 2001. IPO III, 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006). These cases were 
aggregated by issuer, resulting in 310 consolidated actions. Id. The plaintiffs in these class 
actions made allegations of multiple-sometimes contradictory-forms of misconduct. For 
present purposes, this Article will focus exclusively on the allegations of market manipulation 
and will, as above, treat the allegations as true for the sake of clarity. See supra note 108. 
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agreements to purchase shares in the aftermarket."131 These "tie-in 
agreements" with the IPO allocants required the allocants to make 
aftermarket purchases at escalating prices-a practice known as 
''laddering"-which would create the illusion of market "momen-
tum."132 By unloading their shares into this momentum, "[I] adderers 
could stand to profit from such tie-in agreements by selling their 
large allocation of IPO shares as well as their after-IPO purchases 
at inflated prices resulting from the laddering activities."133 The 
underwriters, in turn, would "profit by receiving higher than nor-
mal commissions from the ladderers," or from other types of kick-
backs.134 Although somewhat more complicated than the other 
manipulations we have seen, laddering still fits comfortably into our 
definition: (1) the allocants' trading is intended to move the price 
upward, creating an illusion of momentum; (2) the trading is not 
motivated by a genuine belief that the shares would otherwise go 
up; 135 and (3) the allocants' profit came from selling into the 
momentum created by their own laddering trades, not from any new 
information. Similarly, the investment banks profited by receiving 
kickbacks from the allocants. 
5. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities 
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities Ltd. is another securities class 
action, filed by shareholders of Genesislntermedia, Inc. (GENI).136 
Deutsche Bank masterminded the manipulative scheme together 
with officers of G ENI.137 The officers of G ENI engaged in securities 
131. IPO III, 471 F.3d at 27. The "aftermarket" simply refers to the open, public market 
for the shares following the IPO. 
132. See Joshua Ronen & Bharat Sarath, On the Feasibility of Laddering, in HANDBOOK 
OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 843, 843 (Cheng-Few Lee, Alice C. Lee & 
John Lee eds., 2010). For more information on laddering, see generally Qing Hao, Laddering 
in Initial Public Offerings, 85 J. FIN. ECON~ 102 (2007). 
133. Ronen & Sarath, supra note 132, at 843. 
134. Id. 
135. The allocants and underwriters allegedly knew the issuing companies were of low 
quality. IPO III, 4 71 F.3d at 43-44. 
136. 573 F.3d 931,933 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). At the time of the manipulation, GENI 
stock traded on the NASDAQ. Id. 
137. Id. The version of the alleged scheme presented here is somewhat simplified. For 
greater detail, see Stephenson v. Deutsche Bank AG, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1045-51 (D. Minn. 
2003). 
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loans, lending unregistered shares to a broker-dealer in exchange 
for cash collateral to the officers. 138 Under the terms of the securities 
loans, as the value of the securities increased (or decreased), the 
amount of cash collateral would also increase (or decrease), with 
interest paid to the borrowers also increasing (or decreasing). 139 
"Adjustments [to the amount of collateral and the interest pay-
ments]-marking the securities to the market-[were] made 
daily."140 The shares were ultimately reloaned to Deutsche Bank, 
with "a chain of broker-dealers" interposed between Deutsche Bank 
and the initial broker-dealer "in order to increase the amount of 
capital for the scheme and to insulate Deutsche Bank from any 
fallout should the scheme collapse."141 The GENI officers used the 
cash collateral received for their shares to "day-trade in GENI's 
publicly traded shares."142 This trading created a misleading 
"appearance of investor demand" that, in turn, inflated the stock 
price. 143 The higher stock price "required the borrowers of G ENI 
stock ... to provide more cash collateral to feed the cycle."144 "By 
September 11,2001, the scheme had driven GENI's stock price from 
$12 per share to over $52 per share."145 When the markets reopened 
on September 17, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
GENI's price collapsed, reaching $9 per share by September 25.146 
As the price collapsed, ''borrowers of the stock, starting with 
Deutsche Bank, demanded their cash collateral back."147 Deutsche 
Bank, at the end of the chain of borrowers, "was able to recover 
nearly all the collateral it had pledged, [but] the intermediary 
broker-dealers were not so lucky," as the GENI officers had spent 
the bulk of the cash collateral. 148 "Thus, Deutsche Bank had profited 
138. Desai, 573 F. 3d at 934. 
139. I d. As the circuit court pointed out, "[t]his is not a typical creditor-debtor relationship, 
for the borrower, instead of the lender, receives a stream of income that resembles interest 
payments." Id. at 934 n.3. The court goes on to note that it may be helpful to think of the 
arrangement as "a loan of money secured by stock." Id. 
140. Id. at 934. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 934-35. 
145. Id. at 935. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
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through the [inflated interest] payments it received, [and still] 
managed to recover almost [all of] the cash collateral it had ad-
vanced."149 The scheme alleged in Desai is slightly confusing, but 
still squarely within our definition of manipulation: (1) the GENI 
officers' day-trading-masterminded by Deutsche Bank-was in-
tended to create a false impression of investor interest, causing the 
price to rise; (2) the trading was not motivated by a genuine belief 
that the shares would otherwise go up; and (3) the profits obtained 
by the GENI officers and Deutsche Bank came from the increased 
cash collateral and interest payments, respectively, received as a 
result of the securities loans-not from any new information. 
C. Conditions for Successful Market Manipulation 
With these examples of alleged market manipulations in mind, it 
is possible to examine the types of situations in which manipula-
tions are likely to succeed, and those in which they are likely to fail. 
Fischel and Ross postulate that "[p]rofitable (successful) manipula-
tions require two conditions: first, trading must cause the price of 
the relevant security to rise; and second, the manipulator must be 
able to sell at a price higher than the price at which the manipulator 
purchased (plus transactions costs incurred)."150 In turn, trades can 
cause prices to rise in two ways: (1) directly, through liquidity or 
demand effects or (2) indirectly, through information effects.151 
1. Liquidity and Demand Effects 
The most obvious mechanism by which trading could cause prices 
to rise is that the trades themselves directly move prices by 
increasing demand and reducing supply. 152 Indeed, "[m]ost discus-
sions of manipulation assume that there is a direct relationship 
between trading and price movements."153 Three of the five manipu-
lative schemes described above (GAF, Milken, andMulheren) appear 
149. Id. 
150. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 512. As is discussed infra notes 168-69 and 
accompanying text, this second condition is less essential. 
151. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 514-16. 
152. See id. at 515-17. 
153. Id. at 513. 
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to fit this mold-swamping the market with orders to create a brief 
uptick in prices. The reality, however, is not always so simple. The 
market for financial securities is, in important respects, completely 
unlike the familiar markets for real goods like cars or carrots, in 
which sloping supply and demand curves meet to set a market-
clearing price. 
Judge Easterbrook explained this vividly-if somewhat causti-
cally-in West v. Prudential Securities, Inc. 154 In West-a case in-
volving a nonpublic misrepresentation regarding Jefferson Savings 
Bancorp stock155-Judge Easterbrook took to task plaintiffs' expert, 
who assumed "that all trades affect prices by raising demand ... as 
if there were an economic market in 'Jefferson Savings stock' as 
there is in dill pickles or fluffy towels."156 As Judge Easterbrook 
pointed out, "investors do not want Jefferson Savings stock (as if 
they sought to paper their walls with beautiful certificates); they 
want monetary returns (at given risk levels), returns that are 
available from many financial instruments."157 The result is that 
"[t]here are so many substitutes for any one firm's stock that the 
effective demand curve is horizontal[,] ... not sloped like the demand 
curve for physical products."158 
Of course, Judge Easterbrook is talking about efficient markets, 159 
and "[o]ne fundamental attribute of efficient markets is that 
information, not demand in the abstract, determines stock prices."160 
The situation is different in relatively inefficient markets. In an 
154. 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002). 
155. ld. at 936-38. This nonpublic misrepresentation was alleged to have affected the 
market price through the trades of the misled individuals. Id. 
156. !d. at 939. 
157. Id.; see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 513-14 ("Investors hold securities to 
obtain a stream of future income that can be used to finance future consumption and 
investment. To achieve this goal, they can choose from many possible combinations of 
available assets.") (citations omitted). 
158. West, 282 F.3d at 939. See also Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 513-14 ("Portfolio 
theory provides powerful reasons to believe that demand and supply [for stocks] are elastic .... 
[Thus,] a high percentage of block trades occurs at the existing market price."). 
159. The plaintiffs' expert in West "took the view that the market for Jefferson Savings 
securities is efficient," so that the plaintiffs could take advantage of the FOTM presumption. 
West, 282 F.3d at 939. 
160. RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 
15-18, 25-46 (2d ed. 1983); Id. (citing Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution 
Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179 (1972)). 
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inefficient market, liquidity and price pressure effects can begin to 
be significant and cause large block trades to have an impact on 
price. 161 Such liquidity costs often take the form of a wide bid-ask 
spread, which compensates market makers for serving as intermedi-
aries until a counterparty can be found. 162 Simply by placing a 
market purchase order, a would-be manipulator can often increase 
the observed market price by the amount of the spread, which can 
be significant in thinly traded stocks. 163 By continually swamping 
the supply of ready sellers, a manipulator could, therefore, conceiv-
ably raise quoted prices. 
Fischel and Ross also discuss "price pressure" effects, which could 
be caused by trading "if the demand and supply for securities are 
not perfectly elastic."164 If the available supply of an individual 
security is not bottomless, and that "securit[yl possess[es] unique 
characteristics" such that "perfect substitutes do not exist," then a 
downward-sloping demand curve can result. 165 As a result, "in-
creases in supply or demand can cause price changes,"166 just as they 
do for most real goods-like dill pickles and fluffy towels. 
Two points about liquidity and price pressure effects require 
emphasis. First, both effects are likely to be symmetrical-that is, 
any change in price caused by manipulative trades is likely to be 
offset when the manipulative trades are unwound. "If purchases 
increase the demand and thus the price, sales will have the opposite 
effect."167 The same is true of liquidity effects. 168 But, as the above 
161. Fischel and Ross describe "liquidity" effects as follows: 
An investor who wants to buy or sell a large quantity of shares immediately may 
be unable to do so at the market price because at that moment there are not 
enough market participants willing to take the other side ofthe trade. To induce 
others to participate, a buyer (seller) may have to pay a premium (sell at a 
discount). Such premiums (discounts) compensate intermediaries for the costs 
of maintaining a short (long) position until another investor willing to sell (buy) 
can be found. 
Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 515-16. 
162. Id. at 516. 
163. Id. at 516, 518. 
164. Id. at 516. 
165. Id.; see also Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 
579, 588-89 (1986). 
166. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 516. 
167. Id. at 519. 
168. This symmetry led Fischel and Ross to conclude that such manipulative schemes fail 
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examples show, the manipulator does not necessarily need to profit 
from unwinding the manipulative trades themselves in order for the 
scheme as a whole to be profitable. In all but the IPO case, the bulk 
of the profits came from contractual payments tied to the market 
price of a security-not from being able to sell stock on the open 
market at artificially inflated prices. 169 Thus, the symmetrical 
nature of liquidity and price pressure effects does not mean they 
cannot be the basis of successful manipulations. 
The second point-which is even more important for present 
purposes-is that liquidity and price pressure effects are far more 
likely to be appreciable in inefficient markets than in efficient 
markets. To say that an efficient market will be difficult to manipu-
late is practically tautological at a theoretical level-a good working 
definition of an efficient market for a security is one in which 
the second requirement for a successful manipulation-that the manipulator be able to sell 
at a higher price than the price at which he purchased-and thus are "completely self-
deterring." Id. 
169. In GAF, the profits came from a negotiated bulk sale of shares with the purchase price 
tied to the prevailing market price. See United States v. GAF, 928 F.2d 1253, 1256 (2d Cir. 
1991); see also supra Part II.B.l. In Milken, the profits came from investment banking fees 
that followed from triggering a contractual right to call preferred stock. See United States v. 
Milken, 759 F. Supp. 109, 115-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also supra Part II.B.2. InMulheren, the 
profits again came from a negotiated bulk sale of shares with the purchase price tied to the 
prevailing market price. See United States v. Mulheren, 928 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991); see 
also supra Part II.B.3. In Desai, the profits came from the cash collateral and interest 
payments received as part of a series of securities loans. See Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 
573 F.3d 931, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also supra Part II.B.5. Only in IPO did 
at least some portion of the profits stem from selling stock on the open market at artificially 
inflated prices. Even there, though, much of the ladderers' profits came from selling their 
initial allocation of IPO shares, which were allegedly intentionally underpriced. See IPO III, 
471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); see also supra Part II.B.4. 
Fischel and Ross refer to these types of schemes as "contract-based manipulations," and 
argue that contractual counterparties are most likely able to provide themselves with 
adequate protections against manipulative conduct by contract or price in the lack of such 
protections. See Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 523-25. Although this is almost certainly 
true, and may suggest that the contractual counterparties should not have a claim for 
recovery, it does not follow, as Fischel and Ross suggest, that this ability eliminates the need 
to prohibit such manipulations at all. The contractual counterparties do not bear all the costs 
of a successful manipulation-third parties who purchase at artificially inflated prices will 
also be injured, and the efficient functioning of the market itself will be impaired. The 
fundamental purpose of the securities laws is "[t]o insure to the multitude of investors the 
maintenance offair and honest markets," Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 
787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1283, at 11 (1934)), not simply to protect the 
counterparties directly harmed by contract-based manipulations. 
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(1) the demand curve is horizontal170 and (2) there are sufficient 
arbitrageurs to take the opposite side of any trade that would move 
the price away from the best guess as to its fundamental value. 171 
Such a market would be immune to manipulation. 
Even at a practical level, however, it is easy to see that liquidity 
and price pressure manipulations are far more likely to have 
appreciable effects in inefficient markets. It is now possible to 
return to the example from the beginning of the Article with a more 
refined intuition.172 For which security would an aspiring manipula-
tor have more luck appreciably moving the price using liquidity 
effects: a blue-chip stock like Microsoft, which has a bid-ask spread 
that rarely exceeds a few cents, usually less than 0.1 percent of the 
share price, and more than fifty million shares changing hands 
daily?173 Or a cow-chip stock like Odyssey Marine Exploration, 
which frequently has a bid-ask spread of nearly 10 percent of the 
share price, and has only three hundred thousand shares changing 
hands on a typical day?174 
Likewise, is a manipulator likely to be able to tilt the demand 
curve for Microsoft, which has a market capitalization in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars and well over $1 billion in shares 
traded on an average day?175 If the available supply of Microsoft 
shares is not actually infinite, it is close enough for most purposes. 
As Fischel and Ross point out, "[t)o the extent that the evidence 
supports the existence of a price pressure effect, it indicates that 
securities have supply and demand elasticities no smaller in 
magnitude than 1.'>176 This means that a manipulator would need to 
buy at least 1 percent of a company's outstanding shares-a 
purchase that would be in the billions of dollars for Microsoft-in 
order to raise the share price by a measly 1 percent. The would-be 
manipulator might again find the going easier with Odyssey, with 
170. Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Voting Rules in Corporate America: Majority 
Rule, Corporate Legitimacy, and Minority Shareholder Protection, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 895, 924 
(1996). 
171. Oldham, supra note 43, at 1016. 
172. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
173. See Yahoo! Finance, Microsoft Corp., supra note 12. 
17 4. See Yahoo! Finance, Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., http://www.fmance.yahoo.com/ 
q?s=OMEX (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
17 5. See Y ahool Finance, Microsoft Corp., supra note 12. 
176. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 518. 
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a market capitalization of less than $100 million and only a few 
hundred thousand dollars worth of shares trading on any given 
day.I77 
2. Information Effects 
Aside from direct liquidity or price pressure effects, manipulative 
trading can have a more subtle effect on prices through "information 
effects."178 In short, manipulators, through their trading activity, 
can affect prices by creating a false belief in other traders that the 
trading reflects the presence of new information. This false belief 
can be relatively sophisticated-a belief by sophisticated investors 
that the manipulator possesses some new non public information-or 
177. See Yahoo! Finance, Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., supra note 174. Even stocks 
that normally trade in highly efficient markets can exhibit surprisingly dramatic liquidity 
effects under certain circumstances, as occasionally occurs in a short squeeze. For example, 
on January 25,2010, a number of investment funds flied a claim against Porsche arising from 
a massive short squeeze triggered when Porsche made a surprise announcement that it had 
gained control of 74 percent of Volkswagen's voting shares. Posting of Zachery Kouwe to 
Dealbook, http:l/dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/hedge-funds-sue-porsche-for-1-billion-
lost-on-vw (Jan. 25, 2010, 14:17 EST). With almost all of the remaining shares either state-
owned or tied up in index funds, short-sellers were forced to close their positions at hugely 
inflated prices, more than tripling Volkswagen's share price and briefly making it the world's 
largest company by market capitalization. Id. This violent liquidity shock came despite the 
fact that the market for Volkswagen stock is normally extremely efficient. 
The so-called "flash crash" of May 6, 2010, provides an even more dramatic example. Broad 
market indexes fell by up to 10 percent, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average losing more 
than 600 points in approximately 5 minutes. Tom Lauricella, Market Plunge Baffles Wall 
Street - Trading Glitch Suspected in 'Mayhem' as Dow Falls Nearly 1,000, Then Bounces, 
WALL ST. J., May 7, 2010, at Al. Early inquiries suggest that a liquidity crunch exacerbated 
by program trading caused the wild swings. See SEC & COMMODITY FuTURES TRADING 
COMM'N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2010). 
178. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 934 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("A 
common way to manipulate the market in a security is to cause its price to increase by 
creating the illusion of more investor interest than really exists."). Fischel and Ross describe 
this effect as follows: 
[T]he price of a security at any point in time depends on the value investors 
expect it will provide in the future. That future value is uncertain. Investors who 
obtain information that the future value is high relative to today's price will 
want to buy. Their purchases, however, may lead other market participants to 
revise upward their expectations about the value of the security and thus cause 
[the] price to rise. Because the market price is a function of the information 
available, trading may affect the market price by providing market participants 
with additional information. 
Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 515. 
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relatively na'ive-a belief by retail investors that a price movement 
reflects "momentum" for the stock.179 Of course, would-be manipula-
tors face problems in creating the intended price effect. First, 
"[t]rading will affect prices only if the prospective manipulator can 
convince others that his trading was informed," and "[t]rades in an 
anonymous market are not likely to have this effect."180 As a result, 
many, if not most, block trades take place with no change in price 
at all. 181 What is more, "the more informed [the manipulator] ap-
pears, the more likely prices will rise simultaneously with the 
purchase and not thereafter."182 Again, it is markets for inefficient 
stocks that are more likely to be appreciably moved by manipulative 
"information effects." Is a manipulator more likely to convince other 
traders, purely through his trading activity, that he has uncovered 
some new material information about Microsoft, or Odyssey?183 
179. See Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, Disagreement and the Stock Market, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 109, 120-22 (2007). These information effects are, of course, inconsistent with 
extreme conceptions of perfect market efficiency. No real market, however, can be perfectly 
efficient without destroying the mechanisms that generate efficiency in the first place. See 
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of lnformationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 403-05 (1980). In any "real" market, decoding of the 
information content of trading activity is one of the primary "mechanisms" for generating 
efficiency. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 105, at 572-79. That said, empirical studies 
do not support the idea that prices have "momentum," at least over time scales that are 
relevant to retail investors. Nonetheless, some models of investor behavior and bubble 
dynamics support the creation of feedback loops of momentum traders-investors believing 
that a stock has momentum buy the stock, causing the price to go up and attracting even more 
momentum investors. See Robert A. Jarrow, Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and 
Short Squeezes, 27 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE .ANALYSIS 311, 311-12, 326, 332-33 (1992). 
180. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 517. A recent survey of SEC enforcement actions 
found that manipulators are likely to be "'potentially informed parties' such as corporate 
insiders, brokers, underwriters, large shareholders, and market makers." Aggarwal & Wu, 
supra note 13, at 1917. 
181. See Robert E. Holthausen, Richard W. Leftwich & David Mayers, The Effect of Large 
Block Transactions on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 245-
46 (1987). 
182. Fischel & Ross, supra note 102, at 517. In addition, the would-be manipulator faces 
the same problem of symmetry as we saw in our discussion of liquidity and price pressure 
effects-"as the manipulator sells off his shares he depresses the price, which lessens his 
profit." Desai, 573 F.3d at 934- Again, though, apart from !PO, none of the examples of 
manipulation we have seen required the manipulator to unwind the manipulative trades to 
profit. As the court in Desai said of the securities loan arrangement in that case, "this scheme 
solved the classic problem of market manipulators everywhere: it allowed them to profit from 
fraudulently inflating a stock's price without having to sell the shares." !d. at 935. 
183. Remember that any overt fraudulent statements would be better analyzed as 
misrepresentations. We are concerned here only with pure, trade-based manipulation.s. 
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Consider the possibilities for Microsoft. The manipulator would need 
to engage in trading that would be discernible among the tens of 
millions of shares traded daily, and that would somehow convince 
sophisticated price-decoders that the manipulator possesses new 
material information about Microsoft-a company followed closely 
by the financial press, hundreds of professional security analysts, 
and countless deep-pocketed arbitrageurs. Alternatively, the manip-
ulator would need, through the type of liquidity or price pressure 
effects discussed in Part II.C.1, to create enough of a price move-
ment to gull na'ive investors into discerning "momentum." As we 
have seen, such price movement would be difficult or impossible to 
create in any reasonably efficient market. 
The chances of success would be much greater for an thinly 
traded stock like Odyssey. First, it would be more plausible that the 
manipulator could have new material information about a less 
closely followed company. Furthermore, it would be easier to create 
a noticeable spike in price, or at least in trading activity, that could 
attract momentum investors and create a feedback loop. 
This reasoning is supported by recent economic research. Indeed, 
modeling of the kind of ''laddering" alleged in !PO requires a 
downward-sloping demand curve for the relevant stock-a condition 
that is inconsistent with an efficient market-in order for the ma-
nipulation to be successful. 184 Experience supports these theoretical 
predictions. A recent survey of SEC enforcement actions alleging 
market manipulation between 1990 and 2001 found "that most 
manipulation cases happen in relatively inefficient markets, such 
as the OTC Bulletin Board and the Pink Sheets, that are small and 
illiquid."185 In sum, whether the alleged manipulation is the kind of 
direct liquidity or price pressure trading at issue in GAF, Milken, 
184. See Ronen & Barath, supra note 132; Hao, supra note 132, at 102-22; Rajesh K. 
Aggarwal, Arniyatosh K. Purnanandam & Guojun Wu, Underwriter Manipulations in Initial 
Public Offerings (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686252. Ronen and 
Barath also conclude that "laddering is not a sustainable activity" unless there is a large 
number of momentum traders and a lack of short-sellers or other arbitrageurs-again, 
conditions inconsistent with market efficiency. Ronen & Barath, supra note 132, at 843. Even 
under these assumptions,. the actual manipulative trading is not profitable: "Laddering 
becomes feasible only in the sense that the profits made through the initial [IPO allocation] 
at low issue prices outweigh the losses made in the aftermarket; it does not mean that prices 
are inflated for any significant length of time." Id. at 844. 
185. Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 13, at 1917. 
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and Mulheren, the "information effect" trading at issue in Desai, or 
the "laddering" at issue in IPO, the manipulations are far more 
likely to have a material impact on prices in inefficient markets. 186 
Despite this, it is the shareholders of Microsoft who would have an 
easier time getting past the crucial class certification stage on a 
well-pleaded claim of market manipulation. The unfortunate share-
holders of Odyssey Marine Expeditions would struggle to gain class 
certification for a well-pleaded claim of market manipulation, as 
they would likely stumble on the required showing of an efficient 
market. 
Ill. THE "EFFICIENT MARKET" REQUIREMENT IN MANIPULATION 
CLAIMS 
Having established that market manipulation schemes are most 
likely to succeed in thinly traded, inefficient markets and are likely 
to fail in efficient markets, it is now possible to address the central 
question of this Article: does it make sense to require lOb-5 
plaintiffs alleging market manipulation to establish an efficient 
market in order to gain the benefit of the FOTM presumption of 
reliance? Does such a requirement follow from the principles 
evidenced by the case law? The answer at this point should be clear: 
no. The "efficient market" requirement manages to screen out the 
cases where manipulation is most likely to occur and have an 
appreciable impact. Indeed, the type of evidence that would tend to 
show that a market manipulation scheme had a material effect on 
the market for a security would be precisely the type of evidence 
that would tend to show that the market was inefficient. At the 
same time, the "efficient market" requirement does nothing to 
prevent truly dubious claims of manipulation of blue-chip stocks 
f~om getting past the crucial class certification stage, where they are 
hkely to be settled. Furthermore, as we shall see, there is a paradox 
at the heart of the concept that an investor can simultaneously rely 
V ~:6 · This is not to say that manipulation is never possible in more efficient markets. As the 
. 
0d swagen and "flash crash" examples show, highly efficient stocks-or even broad market 
In exes-can occasionally exhibit characteristics permitting successful manipulation. See 
supra note 177 I · · be s . · tIS simply to say that a requirement that screens out inefficient stocks will 
creemng out many-and probably most--<:ases of effective manipulation. 
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upon prices set by an efficient market and a manipulative price 
signal. 
Although this position-that a showing of market efficiency is an 
inappropriate "gatekeeping" requirement for class actions alleging 
market manipulation-would mark a clear break with current 
practice, it is actually a relatively modest proposition. One need not 
reject either the FOTM doctrine or the relevance of the ECMH to 
that doctrine in order to accept the conclusion here. Others have 
called for far more extreme breaks with precedent-breaks that 
would likely require new legislation or overruling of Supreme Court 
precedent. 
For example, some scholars and practitioners have called for 
abandoning the FOTM presumption altogether, usually on the 
practical grounds that it generates a potential for crushing liability 
divorced from the merits, 187 but also on theoretical grounds. 188 
Others have criticized courts' use of concepts of market efficiency at 
all. 189 More to the point, several scholars have questioned whether 
a stringent showing of market efficiency should be required for any 
lOb-5 claims at all, without drawing any distinction between mis-
representation claims and market manipulation claims. 190 This 
attack has been on both links of the chain of indirect causation. 
First, scholars have noted that perfect efficiency-or even high 
efficiency-is not required for a stock price to be distorted by a 
187. See Alexander, supra note 100; Romano, supra note 100. 
188. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 88, at 625 (arguing that "rejecting FOTM and requiring 
individualized proof of reliance as a prerequisite to recovery under Rule 10b-5 would most 
closely approximate optimal deterrence"). 
189. The principal thrust of these criticisms has tended to be that economists have, in light 
of the rise of behavioral economics, "become less convinced that market efficiency works quite 
so cleanly or powerfully'' as might have seemed likely when Basic was decided. Langevoort, 
supra note 78, at 197. Similarly, the PSLRA also casts doubt on the extent to which courts 
should inject notions of market efficiency into securities law. See Carden, supra note 97; 
Oldham, supra note 43, at 1003; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and 
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853-56 (1992) 
[hereinafter Langevoort, Theories]; Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial 
Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 1017, 1017-21, 1049 (1991); Robert G. Newkirk, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the 
Market in the Initial Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393, 1394-95 (1991). 
190. See Langevoort, supra note 78; Langevoort, Theories, supra note 189, at 889-94, 904-
05; Jonathan R. Macey et al., supra note 189, at 1049. 
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misrepresentation.191 Second, they have argued that a high standard 
for market efficiency is unnecessary to make reasonable an inves-
tor's reliance on the integrity of the market price.192 This Article 
takes no position on whether a showing of market efficiency should 
be required in misrepresentation cases; indeed, this Article assumes 
it should. Whether the arguments against the use of market effi-
ciency are persuasive as applied to misrepresentation cases-and 
the courts have not appeared to find them persuasive193-the 
market efficiency requirement is, at the very least, not inherently 
illogical as applied in such cases. Perhaps it is true that even inef-
ficient markets can be distorted in a measurable way by misrepre-
sentations. But it is also true, as the First Circuit pointed out in its 
recent In re PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation opinion, that 
market efficiency creates greater confidence that the particular 
misinformation alleged by the plaintiffs was, in fact, reflected in the 
price, and reflected in a rapid and predictable fashion. 194 
Similarly, even if it would be reasonable for a retail investor to 
rely on the market price in a less-than-efficient market, presumably 
191. Langevoort, for example, notes that "contemporary literature suggests that even for 
widely traded stocks, substantial deviations from the efficiency ideal are quite possible." 
Langevoort, supra note 78, at 175 (citing Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market 
Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 450 (2006)). Indeed, the 
price of a stock trading on relatively inefficient markets can also be distorted by public 
misrepresentations. See, e.g., Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2005). 
In Bell, the Fifth Circuit "affirmed a refusal to certify a Nasdaq-traded stock with some 
twenty or so market makers and high trading volume in the context of a case where 
immediately after a surprise disclosure of bad news, the stock price fell by some 30 percent." 
Langevoort, supra note 78, at 173. Furthermore, as was discussed in Part II, commentators 
and courts were invoking the FOTM presumption long before the ECMH made a home for 
itself in the legal academy. 
192. Langevoort argues that Basic "makes sense only if we see it as creating an entitlement 
to rely on market-price integrity, even though there is no good reason for any investor simply 
to assume the absence of fraud." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 178. From this proposition, he 
reasons that the FOTM presumption "should permit recovery without a showing of actual 
reliance ... so long as the market is sufficiently well organized that we have reason to believe 
that fraud is likely to distort the price." Id. In this view, inefficiency should only bar the 
presumption "where the institutional price-setting mechanism is so weak that reliance on 
price integrity is manifestly unreasonable. It takes a high level of inefficiency for that to be 
the case." Id. 
193. One court did recognize the increasing academic skepticism of the ECMH, but decided 
that any reexamination of Basic in light of this skepticism was a job for the Supreme Court. 
Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005). 
194. 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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it is more reasonable for them to rely on the market price in an 
efficient market. Certainly it would not be less reasonable. 195 Thus, 
the requirement of an efficient market is not actually counterpro-
ductive in misrepresentation cases. At the very least, the links in 
the chain of indirect causation are strengthened by a showing of 
market manipulation, not weakened. 
Securities class actions are inherently complex, uncertain, and 
expensive undertakings. It is only prudent to impose a gatekeeping 
requirement limiting the universe of cases to those in which the 
mechanism of injury is relatively clean and well-understood. The 
market efficiency requirement-even if imperfect-is at least a 
gesture in this direction in misrepresentation cases. It functions to 
screen out cases in which the relationship between the alleged 
misrepresentation and the price impact-if any-is likely to be mud-
dled or attenuated, while preserving those in which the relationship 
is likely to be more straightforward. 196 The same, however, cannot 
be said about applying the market efficiency requirement in manip-
ulation cases. As we have seen above, market manipulations are 
most likely to have a relatively straightforward impact on prices in 
inefficient markets and least likely to have an impact in efficient 
markets. And yet, blind application of the efficient market require-
ment screens out those cases in which plaintiffs are most likely to 
suffer injury from manipulation, while waving through those cases 
in which plaintiffs are least likely to have suffered any injury. The 
results of the market efficiency requirement are positively perverse 
in manipulation cases-market efficiency actually severs one of the 
links in the chain of indirect causation. 
This incoherence extends to the question of whether an investor's 
"reliance" on the market price was reasonable. As was discussed in 
195. Even Langevoort-who argues that the presumption of reliance should be treated like 
"a common law-like entitlement to rely on stock-price integrity, granted as a matter of juristic 
grace"-appears to acknowledge that, as a practical matter, "[i]nvestors who buy or sell thinly 
traded stocks should not be assuming much of anything." Langevoort, supra note 78, at 171, 
198. 
196. Macey, Miller, Mitchell, and Netter have pointed out that event studies-identifying 
the impact, if any, of alleged misstatements-ean be done even for thinly traded stocks, but 
the threshold for statistical significance will likely be far higher to reflect increased volatility. 
Macey et al., supra note 189, at 1018. Viewed in this light, the courts' insistence upon market 
efficiency can be seen as expressing skepticism regarding the applicability of event studies in 
inefficient markets. 
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Part I, scholars have occasionally questioned the analogy of secu-
rities fraud to common law fraud. 197 Market manipulation claims 
are yet one more step removed from these common law origins than 
are the misrepresentation cases on which courts and commentators 
have focused. A market manipulator makes no statement or 
omission that an investor could be said to "rely on" in a straightfor-
ward way at all. Indeed, to the extent that investors "rely" on a 
manipulative price signal-that is, believe that it signals price 
"momentum" or the presence of new information-they are register-
ing their belief that the market is not even weak-form efficient. 198 
Even indirect reliance is incoherent in this setting. In a misrepre-
sentation case, if the market reacts to the misrepresentation, clearly 
someone relied-a sufficient number of market participants to drive 
the price.199 But trading manipulation involving liquidity or price 
pressure effects can have an effect on price even with nobody 
"relying" on anything. In these situations, the only thing an investor 
could be relying on is the integrity of the market price, which, in 
turn, could be affected by manipulation without anyone directly 
"relying" in the traditional sense. If "reasonable reliance" can mean 
anything in such a context, it can only mean the kind of "common 
law-like entitlement" favored by Langevoort as a "matter of juristic 
grace."200 Indeed, insofar as market manipulators do more than 
simply seek to mislead investors-they actively seek to exploit the 
mechanics of the market-some support for such an "entitlement" 
in the manipulation setting can be gleaned from the Basic Court's 
197. See supra note 52. Most obviously, Fischel argued that the common law concept of 
reliance is altogether incoherent in the context of open market transactions and has no place 
at all in 10b-5 actions. Fischel, supra note 56, at 11. 
198. Recall that weak-form efficiency implies that prices fully reflect any information 
contained in the past movement of the stock price itself, and thus that stock prices are an 
example of a martingale. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Thus, if an investor 
believes a previous price increase means that future price increases are more likely, then the 
investor does not believe the market is even weak-form efficient. 
199. See supra note 16. 
200. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 198. The question of whether relying on the market 
price for a given security is actually reasonable in practice is distinct from the question of 
whether the law should grant such an entitlement. We may chide a homeowner for foolishly 
leaving his door unlocked in a high-crime area but still not deny him an action against the 
burglar to recover his stolen property. 
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invocation of the market's "integrity," and its oft-quoted question: 
'Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?"201 
So what does this mean for market manipulation cases? Does it 
mean that the FOTM presumption should not be applied at all in 
such cases? No. But it does mean that the presumption must be 
supported by different reasoning and, consequently, different 
showings by the plaintiffs. If the FOTM presumption is to be 
recognized in market manipulation cases, it must be for one of two 
reasons. First, following Fischel, one could conclude that the 
reliance requirement should be discarded entirely as an inapt 
analogy from common law fraud. 202 If, however, one believes that 
the Basic formulation provides a useful framework for misrepresen-
tation claims, and should not be pulled up root and branch, a less 
sweeping argument is required to distinguish market manipulation 
claims. 
The more limited possibility is the one advocated here-to 
acknowledge that Basic's reasoning from market efficiency has some 
force for misrepresentation claims, but to deny its applicability to 
market manipulation claims. If a presumption of reliance is to be 
given to plaintiffs bringing market manipulation claims, it must be 
out of the sense of entitlement suggested by Langevoort.203 It must 
be simply because-as Fischel argues-investors do and rationally 
should rely on prices in open market transactions,204 and the law 
should protect this reliance through a presumptive entitlement, just 
as it protects other reasonable and desirable activities.205 Such an 
act of "juristic grace"206 may not be necessary in misrepresentation 
claims, in which the ECMH allows courts to construct a plausible 
chain of indirect reliance, but it is essential for market manipula-
tion claims. 207 Of course, if the interest being protected is only the 
201. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988). 
202. Fischel, supra note 56, at 11. 
203. See supra note 192. 
204. Fischel, supra note 56, at 3-5. 
205. See RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 111 (7th ed. 2007). The 
argument is that efficiency is enhanced by creating and enforcing a legal right to rely-on 
factual representations or on lack of manipulation-rather than forcing the parties to 
investigate the matter ahead of time. Id. 
206. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
207. An alternative justification for requiring market efficiency in misrepresentation cases 
would be that it is unreasonable for investors to assume an absence of public misinformation, 
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right to rely on the integrity of market prices, this entitlement 
should not, like Basic, create a double presumption of reasonable 
reliance and loss causation. A presumption of loss causation can 
only be justified by assuming that misrepresentations will be 
reflected in prices through the operation of efficient markets. But 
there is no direct analog to this causal mechanism in market 
manipulation cases-as we have seen, market efficiency is likely to 
actually sever the causal chain. Even in an inefficient market, there 
is no comparable reason to assume market impact and loss causa-
tion. Thus, the only plausible presumption, as a matter of "juristic 
grace," is of reasonable reliance. Making this presumption hinge on 
a stringent standard of efficiency is unnecessary and incoherent. 
In Part IV, we will see this incoherence play out-in extravagant, 
extended, and expensive fashion-in two high-profile lawsuits. But 
we need not await this demonstration to state our conclusion: 
''When the rationale for a given legal rule is inapplicable, so too 
must be the rule."208 The rationales for requiring plaintiffs to dem-
onstrate an efficient market are inapplicable in market manipula-
tion cases. Thus, the requirement should be abandoned as incoher-
ent and counterproductive. Even if the requirement plays a useful 
and logical role in misrepresentation cases, it fails to do so in 
manipulation cases.209 
IV. !PO AND DESAI-THE "EFFICIENT MARKET" REQillREMENT IN 
ACTION 
To fully appreciate the counterproductive nature of the "efficient 
market" requirement in market manipulation cases,210 it is helpful 
to take a closer look at two recent, high-profile cases-JPO and 
Desai. 211 Both cases ultimately foundered on the efficient market 
but reasonable-as a matter of law-for investors to assume a lack of affirmative market 
manipulation. See Fischel, supra note 56, at 3-4. 
208. Nagareda, supra note 19, at 137. 
209. This does not imply that having no gatekeeper requirement at all would be an 
improvement over the market efficiency requirement. Potential "replacement" gatekeepers 
are discussed in Part V. 
210. See supra Part III. 
211. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); cases 
cited supra note 25. 
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requirement, but only after years oflitigation that never progressed 
beyond the class certification stage. The outlines of the alleged 
manipulative schemes were described in Part II. A more detailed 
account of the ensuing litigation, however, demonstrates that the 
efficient market requirement eventually did serve as a gatekeeper 
-resulting in dismissal of both cases-but in a fashion almost 
entirely unrelated to the merits of the underlying claims, and only 
after years of expensive wrangling over class certification. 
A. In re IPO Securities Litigation 
In 2001, following the collapse of the dot-com tech stock boom of 
the 1990s, thousands of individual actions were filed against the 
issuers and underwriters for hundreds of IPOs during the bubble. 212 
The plaintiffs' basic premise was that underwriters used various 
illegal schemes to artificially inflate the price of stock for the 
hundreds of new tech issuers in the immediate aftermarket of their 
IPOs.213 The initial allocants and insiders at the issuers were able 
to unload the worthless stock at these inflated prices, kicking back 
a portion of the profits to the underwriters through inflated fees and 
other "undisclosed compensation."214 The plaintiffs alleged a mix of 
what we have been calling "market manipulation" claims and 
"misrepresentation" claims. As for market manipulation, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the underwriters "required their customers to 
enter into agreements to buy additional shares of the Issuer in the 
aftermarket as a condition of receiving the right to purchase the 
IPO stock."215 As part of these so-called "Tie-in Agreements," some 
"customers were ... required to make those purchases at predeter-
mined escalating prices"216-a practice referred to as ''laddering."217 
Although the exact causal mechanisms were left fuzzy, these market 
manipulations evidently are supposed to have inflated price through 
a combination ofliquidity, price pressure, and information effects.218 
212. IPO I, 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 293-94. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
218. IPO L 241 F. Supp. 2d at 303-07. The plaintiffs also alleged a welter of misrep-
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1. Initial District Court Proceedings 
The primary struggle in IPO was over class certification, an issue 
that ballooned into a five-year war of experts centered on the issues 
of market efficiency and loss causation. The plaintiffs sought a class 
period for each stock ranging from the IPO date to December 6, 
2000219-a period that stretched over eighteen months for at least 
one stock-and sought to rely on the FOTM presumption of reli-
ance.220 In an October 13, 2004, opinion, Judge Scheindlin granted 
class certification.221 On the basis of then-controlling precedents in 
the Second Circuit, 222 Judge Scheindlin found that, in order to 
certify a class in which the elements of Rule 23 are "enmeshed" with 
the merits, plaintiffs needed only make "some showing" that those 
elements were met.223 As a result, Judge Scheindlin found that the 
question of market efficiency was ultimately a faCtual issue "to be 
resolved at trial."224 Accordingly, upon noting that the focus stocks 
(1) traded on the NASDAQ, (2) traded at relatively high volume, and 
(3) were followed by analysts and the media,225 Judge Scheindlin 
resentations-in the registration statements and prospectuses themselves, and in analyst 
reports and other public statements-in support of these supposed market manipulations.Id. 
at 296. Claims for these misrepresentations were brought under sections 11 and 15 of the 
1933 Act, and sections 10(b) and 20 of the 1934 Act. The potential damages stretched into the 
hundreds of billions. Id. at 296-98. 
219. On this date, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page story detailing many of 
the alleged manipulative practices. See Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Seeking IPO Shares, 
Investors Offer To Buy More in After-Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000, at AI. 
220. IPO II, 227 F.R.D. 65, 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). In 
addition to hundreds of pages of briefing and thousands of pages of exhibits and appendices, 
the parties submitted a total of eleven expert reports supporting or opposing class 
certification.Id. at 73-74. 
221. Id. at 74, 122. 
222. Primarily Caridad u. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999), 
and In re Visa Check! Master Money Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001), as they 
interpreted Eisen u. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). IPO II, 227 F.R.D. at 92-93. 
See also supra text accompanying note 95 (noting the tension in the precedent). 
223. IPO II, 227 F.R.D. at 92-93. 
224. Id. at 107. 
225. Id. Judge Scheindlin mentioned that "[t]he Second Circuit has not adopted a test or 
method for determining whether the market for a security is efficient," and listed the Cammer 
factors as plausible indicia, but held out the possibility that less stringent standards for 
market efficiency could also be appropriate. Id. at 107 & n.323. 
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found the undemanding "some showing" standard met for the pur-
poses of class certification.226 
2. Appeal to the Second Circuit-IPO III 
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered two issues: (1) whether 
the district court was correct to use the lenient "some showing" 
standard at class certification; and (2) whether the Basic presump-
tion could apply. 227 Before the Second Circuit, in addition to a 
sweeping argument that the FOTM presumption should never apply 
to market manipulation claims, 228 the defendants pointed out that, 
under Basic, a presumption of reliance could not be afforded to the 
plaintiffs because they had failed to demonstrate an efficient 
market. 229 Furthermore, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs 
had failed to establish that loss causation could be proved on a 
common basis, thus also tacitly recognizing that a presumption of 
loss causation is not warranted in market manipulation cases.230 By 
now, the muddle is painfully obvious. Both sides-defendants and 
plaintiffs alike-are put in a Catch-22 situation by the combination 
of Basic's seeming insistence on market efficiency and the seeming 
226. ld. at 107-08. Interestingly, without explicitly noting that she was doing so, Judge 
Scheindlin appears to have proceeded under the assumption that market efficiency did not 
entitle the plaintiffs to a presumption of loss causation for market manipulation claims. 
Instead, the district court analyzed loss causation separately, asking whether the plaintiffs 
had "present[ed] a methodology for determining loss causation that may be commonly applied 
to all members of the class." ld. at 111. Again, the district court proceeded under the lenient 
"some showing" standard, declining to engage in a duel of the experts at class certification. 
ld. at 93, 114-15. Accordingly, the district court found that the plaintiffs had "satisfied their 
burden at this stage to articulate a theory of loss causation that is not fatally flawed." ld. at 
115. The plaintiffs' proposed methodology was set forth in a trio of expert reports submitted 
by Fischel. See id. at 112-14. 
227. IPO Ill, 471 F.3d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 2006). 
228. Reply Brieffor Defendant-Appellant Underwriters at 26, IPO III, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 
2006) (No. 05-3349-cv), 2005 WL 6068757 [hereinafter IPO III Def. Briefj. In arguing that 
efficient markets are unlikely to be affected by manipulative trading, the defendants relied 
heavily on West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002), and on Fischel's 
academic publications, including Fischel & Ross, supra note 102. IPO III Def. Brief, supra at 
47-48,68. 
229. IPO III Def. Brief, supra note 228, at 31-35. Among other things, the defendants 
argued that post-IPO '"quiet' period[s]" during which analysts cannot report, the inability of 
new issuers to file simplified Form S-3 statements, and the nature of the Internet "bubble" 
all weighed against a fmding that the focus stocks traded in efficient markets. ld. 
230. ld. at 32. 
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incompatibility of efficiency and successful market manipulation. In 
order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs must allege that 
the defendants' manipulative trading had a significant and lasting 
impact on market price-a claim that is broadly inconsistent with 
actual market efficiency. But in order to get a presumption of 
reliance and gain class certification, the plaintiffs are then forced to 
turn around and argue market efficiency. On the other side of the 
coin, in order to combat class certification, the defendants are forced 
to argue that the relevant markets are inefficient. To prevail on the 
merits, however, they would have every reason to turn around and 
argue that, in fact, the markets were too efficient for any manipula-
tive trading to have an appreciable effect. 231 
The muddle is easily resolved, however, when one separates the 
justifications for the FOTM presumption in misrepresentation 
claims from those for the FOTM presumption in market manipula-
tion claims. The district court and the defendants appeared to 
recognize-without saying so explicitly-that loss causation cannot 
be presumed for market manipulation claims. The double presump-
tion is off the table, and the only question at issue is reasonable 
reliance. But as has been shown, the question of "relying" on a 
manipulation is often incoherent-manipulations can have an 
impact on price without anyone "relying" on anything. 232 The court 
must either reject reliance as an element altogether or else must 
treat reliance as an entitlement to rely on the integrity of the 
market. If the court rejects reliance altogether, market efficiency is 
necessarily irrelevant. If the court treats reasonable reliance as a 
matter of entitlement, market efficiency is relevant only insofar as 
we condition the entitlement on some minimum showing that the 
relevant market was open and developed. In either case, the parties 
would not need to tie themselves up in knots arguing simulta-
neously for and against market efficiency. 
Alas, the Second Circuit did not see fit to clear up the muddle 
and, in fact, did not appear to notice it. The bulk of the opinion is 
231. Of course, this is not the only argument open to defendants. They could, for example, 
deny efficiency at the class certification stage and then argue on the merits that the allegedly 
manipulative trades were not motivated by manipulative intent. The point is simply that the 
parties-plaintiff and defendant alike-will generally find it in their interests to argue one 
way with respect to efficiency at class certification, and the other way on the merits. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202. 
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taken up with the procedural question of the proper standard for 
determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met. The 
court joined other circuits in rejecting the lenient "some showing" 
standard, holding that a district court must make a firm determi-
nation-prior to certifying a class-that each of the Rule 23 
requirements has been met, even ifthese requirements overlap with 
the merits. 233 
Because the applicability of the FOTM presumption will deter-
mine the predominance of common issues, this new standard 
entailed rigorous scrutiny of market efficiency at the class certifica-
tion stage.234 Rather than remanding for reconsideration under the 
proper standard, the Second Circuit considered the question itself. 
Although the court suggested that it is "doubtful whether the Basic 
presumption can be extended, beyond its original context, to tie-in 
trading,"235 the court did not consider whether the market efficiency 
requirement was appropriate in this different context, and instead 
cited precedent involving misrepresentation claims. 236 The court 
went on to find that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the presump-
tion in any case, because "the market for IPO shares is not 
efficient"-a finding based largely on the same factors cited by the 
defendants. 237 The court went on to observe that "the [p]laintiffs' 
own allegations as to how slow the market was to correct the alleged 
price inflation despite what they also allege was widespread know-
233. See IPO III, 4 71 F.3d at 42; In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 
2005); Unger v. Aroedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2005); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 
F.3d 562, 566-67, 575 (8th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 368 F. 3d 356, 366 
(4th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be addressed through findings, even 
if they overlap with issues on the merits."), affd, 261 F. App'x 456 (4th Cir. 2008); Newton v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166-69 (3d Cir. 2001); Szabo v. 
Bridgeport Mach., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A] judge should make whatever 
factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23 [even if] the judge must make a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits."). 
234. See, e.g., IPO III, 471 F.3d at 42-43. 
235. Id. at 43. 
236. In describing the FOTM doctrine, the IPO III court cited Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 
F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The fraud-on-the-market doctrine, as described by the Supreme 
Court in Basic [Inc.] v. Levinson, creates a rebuttable presumption that (1) misrepresentations 
by an issuer affect the price of securities traded in the open market, and (2) investors rely on 
the market price of securities as an accurate measure of their intrinsic value."). IPO III, 4 71 
F.3d at 42. 
237. IPO III, 471 F.3d at 42. 
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ledge of the scheme indicate the very antithesis of an efficient 
market."238 This final observation of the !PO III court perfectly 
encapsulates the impossible dilemma facing investors seeking to 
bring market manipulation claims as class actions. Because of the 
"efficient market" requirement, the more plausible the allegations 
of manipulation, the less likely a class is to be certified in the first 
place. 
3. Back to the District Court 
Following !PO III, the district court permitted the plaintiffs to 
amend their allegations to avoid the most glaring defects pointed 
out by the Second Circuit, and then rejected the defendants' motion 
to dismiss the amended complaints.239 At this point, the question 
again became one of class certification. 
For the first time, the plaintiffs attempted to draw a distinction 
between the misrepresentation and market manipulation claims,240 
and argued that the FOTM presumption should function differently 
for the different types of claims.241 For the market manipulation 
claims, the plaintiffs argued that if they could show that loss 
causation was susceptible to classwide proof,242 they should benefit 
from a presumption of reliance if they could show "that the market 
238. Id. at 43. The court also pointed out several other aspects of the claims that were 
"bristling with individual questions." Id. at 44. Indeed, the IPO III court would have had 
ample reason to decertify the classes even if the FOTM presumptions had applied. 
239. IPO IV, 544 F. Supp. 2d 277, 281, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Somewhat implausibly, Judge 
Scheindlin found that the Second Circuit's finding of market inefficiency applied only to the 
primary market for IPO shares, the initial allocation, and not to secondary trading in the 
aftermarket. Id. at 295. Incidentally, nearly a dozen more expert reports were generated in 
the course of briefing the new motion to dismiss. If nothing else, the IPO case highlights what 
a cash machine current doctrine can be for experts on market efficiency. 
240. Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 38, IPO IV, 544 F. Supp. 
2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 21 MC 92) [hereinafter IPO Pl. Brief]. 
241. Mter arguing that Basic provided for a double presumption of reliance and loss 
causation, the plaintiffs acknowledged the need to show market efficiency to gain the FOTM 
presumption for their misrepresentation claims. Id. at 36, 44-45. 
242. Plaintiffs argued that they had "submitted expert reports explaining how Plaintiffs 
intend to prove, on a classwide basis, that Defendants' manipulative conduct artificially 
inflated stock prices." Id. at 38. 
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appeared to be efficient to the average investor"-even if the 
market's efficiency had been destroyed by manipulation. 243 
Although the !PO plaintiffs were unable to offer much in the way 
of support for this argument, it has some appeal when viewed in 
light of the analysis in Part III. Because the picture of indirect 
reliance-through the mechanism of efficient markets-does not 
apply to market manipulations, plaintiffs should not benefit from a 
presumption of loss causation. But if we are to keep reliance as a 
requirement at all, it should be presumed, in keeping with the 
purposes of the 1934 Act: "restoring investor[ J confidence in 
financial markets" and "reducing transaction costs associated with 
a caveat-investor rule."244 As such, investors should be required to 
show only that some basic indicia of efficiency were present in order 
for reasonable reliance to be presumed.245 For better or for worse, 
this argument never got a hearing in court. After eight years of 
litigation, never progressing past the class certification stage, the 
parties reached a settlement for $586 million.246 
243. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that 
in a manipulation case, where the plaintiffs expect to bear the burden of 
establishing the existence of artificial inflation, so long as the plaintiffs can show 
that the market appeared to be efficient to the average investor, they should also 
be "presumed to rely reasonably on the integrity of the market price of a security 
that is traded in such a market." 
Id. (quoting Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1990)). The 
plaintiffs sought to bolster their argument by citing a recent Second Circuit opinion referring 
to "reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation" as an element of 
a market manipulation claim. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d 
Cir. 2007). It seems unlikely, however, that the ATSI panel intended to redefine application 
of Basic in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs. 
244. Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) ("[Congress] enacted legislation to facilitate an investor's 
reliance on the integrity of [securities] markets."). 
245. Unlike a showing of genuine market efficiency, this showing would not necessarily 
contradict a claim of market manipulation, though it still could rule out class actions for 
extremely thinly traded stocks, in which we might think manipulation would be most 
common. 
246. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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B. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Securities 
Desai presents another seven-year odyssey in failed pursuit of 
class certification.247 This time, however, the plaintiffs began 
arguing early on that the reliance requirement should work 
differently in market manipulation claims, forcing the courts to 
confront the issue. The results were dispiriting. 
1. Minnesota District Court 
Mter initially claiming that they were entitled to the FOTM 
presumption of reliance under Basic, the plaintiffs "waffled in their 
presentation of the theory of their case" upon realizing that market 
efficiency would be inconsistent with the allegations of enormous 
price swings due to manipulation.248 The plaintiffs "concede[d] that 
the market for Genesis stock was not 'efficient' as that term is used 
in establishing a fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, 
and [that] a showing of efficiency is essential to the applicability of 
this presumption."249 Instead-like the plaintiffs in !PO eventually 
did-the plaintiffs in Desai claimed "that they 'relied upon the 
integrity of the market, which had been secretly corrupted' by 
Defendants."250 Rather than treating reliance on the "integrity" of 
the market as an entitlement or judicial presumption, the district 
court proceeded to treat it as something that would have to be 
established for each individual plaintiff. 251 As a result, the. court 
found that individual issues would predominate, precluding class 
certification.252 
24 7. The allegations regarding manipulation of Genesis stock were described in some detail 
in Part II.B.5 and will not be repeated here. The procedural history is tangled. The suit itself 
was initially flied in the Central District of California and transferred to the District of 
Minnesota in 2003. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d931, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2009) 
{per curiam). Following denial of class certification, the case was transferred back to 
California. ld. at 936. 
248. In re Genesislntermedia, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 321, 332-33 (D. Minn. 2005). 
249. ld. 
250. ld. at 333. 
251. I d. at 334 ("Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with any authority to establish that 
reliance on the integrity of the market price, without a showing that the market was efficient, 
may create a class-wide presumption of reliance."). 
252. I d. ("Plaintiffs' allegations that each member of the class relied on the integrity of the 
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2. California District Court 
Class certification was considered again by the California district 
court, by which time the plaintiffs presented a more developed 
theory of reliance on the "integrity of the market."253 At the hearing 
on class certification, plaintiffs' counsel began by pointing out that 
market manipulation claims are different in character from the 
"traditional misrepresentation [or] omission case."254 Plaintiffs' went 
on to argue that unlike in a misrepresentation case, in which false 
information affects the market price through the workings of an 
efficient market, in a market manipulation case, the "integrity of 
the market is really what has been attacked."255 In such a case, 
plaintiffs should only be required to show reliance "upon the 
integrity of the market"-namely, "that had they known that the 
market do not, however, provide the Court with the mechanism by which to presume that 
each class member did so."). 
For good measure, the court also argued that because Desai himself was not a passive 
investor-he testified that he bought the stock because it was "mispriced" due to investor 
confusion over an announced stock split-then even the lead plaintiff did not actually rely on 
the "integrity" of the market. !d. at 333. As Fischel pointed out back in 1982, it is "difficult to 
know what to make" of this kind of argument, which "reflect[s] a conceptual confusion 
concerning the market model of the investment decision." Fischel, supra note 56, at 11. "[A]n 
investor could only decide that particular information"-like a stock split-"was relevant by 
reference to the existing market price, ... when deciding whether to purchase/sell." !d. "By 
definition, investors would have paid or received a different price" in the absence of 
manipulation. !d. Thus, even an investor who believes a stock is mispriced relies on the 
integrity of the market in making that judgment. This type of confusion resurfaces with a 
vengeance in the California district court. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
253. In addition to the novel "integrity of the market" theory, the plaintiffs also argued that 
the Affiliated Ute presumption, for cases of material omissions, should apply, based on the 
defendants' failure to disclose the manipulative scheme. In re Genesislntermedia, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 2007 WL 1953475, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Mfiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972)). The court rejected this argument, finding that the 
"[p ]lain tiffs' complaint cannot be construed.as alleging 'primarily' claims of omissions." !d. at 
*7. 
254. !d. Plaintiffs' counsel said the following: 
!d. 
Ninety percent of the cases that have been before Your Honor, someone will 
come in with a 10(K) or false financial and say, look right here on this piece of 
paper, they lied about the condition of the company. That piece of information 
is read by analysts, maybe read by individual investors, and permeates into the 
market price. That is-if the market is efficient, that information is absorbed 
and reflects itself in a higher price. That's a traditional misrepresentation [or] 
omission case. That's not this case. 
255. Id. 
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[manipulation] was afoot ... they never would have purchased their 
stock."256 Plaintiffs went on to note the Catch-22 nature of requiring 
a showing of market efficiency: "you can't possibly require the 
plaintiff to prove an efficient market when, by definition, his own 
expert and the whole proof of the case is going to be that these guys 
manipulated the market to destroy the very efficiency."257 Finally, 
the plaintiffs argued that market efficiency plays a causal role in 
misrepresentation cases that it does not play in market manipula-
tion cases. When a defendant has made a false statement, "there 
has to be a showing that the market was efficient to absorb that 
information," whereas in a manipulation case, "[t]here's nothing 
that can be absorbed that's going to matter."258 The California 
district court rejected this argument on four grounds: (1) that courts 
do not distinguish between misrepresentation and market manipu-
lation claims for purposes of reliance; (2) that no courts have 
adopted an "integrity of the market" theory; (3) that the theory "is 
logically flawed because the inference of reliance is broken if the 
market price of a security does not reflect the manipulative activ-
ity"; and (4) that the plaintiffs had also brought misrepresentation 
claims.259 
This last ground is theoretically uninterestin~60-the question is 
whether an "integrity of the market" theory can ever apply to 
market manipulation claims. The first two grounds merely restate 
the same conclusion twice-one which is readily apparent at this 
point: that courts, to date, have not thought through the salient 
differences between misrepresentation and market manipulation 
claims. The question was whether this court would be any different. 
In the analysis supporting its third reason, the court answers with 
a resounding "no." 
In arguing that the plaintiffs' theory is "logically flawed," the 
court rehearses the usual story of indirect reliance. But the court 
reflexively extends this story to manipulations, stating that 
"[r]eliance on the stock price is presumed to demonstrate indirect 
256. ld. 
257. ld. at *8. 
258. ld. 
259. ld. 
260. A legitimate question exists, of course, as to how plaintiffs should be permitted to 
establish reliance in cases involving both manipulation and overt misrepresentation. 
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reliance on a misrepresentation or manipulation because an 
efficient market reflects the misrepresentation or manipulation in 
the price of the stock."261 But, the court held, the plaintiffs conceded 
that the market was not efficient. 
Therefore, the Court cannot presume that the Genesis stock 
price reflected any misrepresentations or manipulative conduct. 
As a result, even if a plaintiff relied on the stock price when 
purchasing Genesis securities, the Court cannot presume that 
such reliance constitutes indirect reliance on a manipulation or 
misrepresentation. In other words, a key link in the chain of 
inferences supporting the presumption of reliance is broken 
where the market is not efficient. Therefore, even if it is undis-
puted that the Plaintiffs relied on the integrity of the market 
when they purchased Genesis stock, the Court has no means to 
rationally infer that the Plaintiffs relied on the manipulations or 
misrepresentations at issue. 262 
Unfortunately, this reasoning has it completely backward. As is 
shown in Part I.B.1, although it is perfectly true that market 
efficiency strengthens the supposition that a misrepresentation will 
be reflected in the price, market efficiency actually weakens any 
supposition that manipulative trading will have an effect on price. 
Of course, this makes the double presumption of Basic-reliance 
AND loss causation-untenable in manipulation cases. Plaintiffs 
will still need to show that the alleged manipulations actually 
affected the market price. If anything, however, such a showing 
would be made far less likely by the existence of a highly efficient 
market. But if plaintiffs can establish an effect on prices, then "[b]y 
definition, investors would have paid or received a different price 
had there been no fraud on the market,"263 efficient market or not. 
3. The Ninth Circuit Opinion 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion almost entirely 
dodged the "integrity of the market" question. After giving a brief 
261. Genesisintermedia, 2007 WL 1953475, at *13. 
262. Id. 
263. Fischel, supra note 56, at 11. 
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summary of the plaintiffs' argument, the majority dismissed it in 
three words: 'We are chary."264 After declaring their chariness, the 
majority simply noted that "[n]o authority required the district court 
to adopt [plaintiffs'] integrity of the market presumption,"265 and 
that the Supreme Court had cautioned that "the § lO(b) private 
right should not be extended beyond its present boundaries."266 As 
a result, the majority concluded that "the district court did not 
abuse its discretion" in rejecting the "integrity of the market" 
theory. 267 A concurrence by Judge O'Scannlain faulted the court for 
passing the buck, noting that if the presumption put forth by the 
plaintiffs is ''legally valid," its rejection is necessarily an abuse of 
discretion. 268 Judge O'Scannlain then proceeded to "address the 
integrity of the market presumption on the merits," ultimately 
rejecting it. 269 First, Judge O'Scannlain reiterated that current case 
law does not recognize such a theory. 270 He then went on to reject 
the theory on the merits, arguing that it "would permit a presump-
tion of reliance no matter how unlikely it is that the market price in 
question would actually reflect the alleged manipulation."271 
The traditional requirement of an efficient market does not 
address Judge O'Scannlain's concern, though, and in fact exacer-
bates it. As we have seen, market manipulations are most likely to 
affect market prices in inefficient markets, and most unlikely to 
affect market prices in efficient markets. Yet Judge O'Scannlain 
would allow claims of manipulation in efficient markets an express 
lane to class certification-and almost certain settlement-but block 
claims of manipulation in inefficient markets. 
264. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
265. Id. 
266. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008). 
This quote is arguably pulled out of context. The issue in Stoneridge was whether a private 
right of action exists for aiders and abettors-a new cause of action already rejected in Central 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). By 
contrast, private actions for market manipulation have existed for decades. 
267. Desai, 573 F.3d at 942. 
268. Id. at 943 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (''We review class certification decisions for 
abuse of discretion, but errors of law constitute per se abuses of discretion."). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 943-44. 
271. Id. at 945. 
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Judge O'Scannlain concluded the plaintiffs' theory "would prove 
too much while doing too little."272 Too much, ''because it would 
obviate the need for plaintiffs in manipulative conduct cases to 
prove reliance."273 Too little, ''because it does not complete the causal 
connection between a plaintiffs transaction in securities and a 
defendant's manipulation."274 Tellingly, these concerns are only 
valid if Judge O'Scannlain is picturing the double presumption from 
Basic. But, as the plaintiffs in IPO ultimately argued, a presump-
tion of reliance on the integrity of the market does not necessarily 
entail a presumption of loss causation. The plaintiffs can still be 
required to show that the price during the class period was affected 
by the manipulation. Of course, because Judge O'Scannlain is no 
doubt aware that securities class actions overwhelmingly settle 
upon certification of a class, it may be that he is really concerned 
that, unless the plaintiffs are required to show loss causation at 
class certification, they will never be required to show it at all.275 
At the end of his concurrence, Judge O'Scannlain appeared to 
acknowledge the very problem discussed in this Article-that the 
market-efficiency-based story of indirect reliance underlying the 
double-presumption version of the FOTM theory might not really 
apply to manipulation cases. In a footnote, he noted that "a plaintiff 
must still show that the market in question could absorb into the 
price the misinformation communicated by the alleged manipula-
tion," but asked whether a plaintiff should be required to "show the 
same type of proof of an efficient market in a manipulation case as 
is required in a misrepresentation case."276 Ultimately, however, 
Judge O'Scannlain found that this question was not before the 
court, as the plaintiffs "forsook the fraud on the market theory."277 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. This is a very real concern and is addressed in Part V. 
276. Desai, 573 F.3d at 945-46 n.l. 
277. Id. This statement is perhaps questionable. The plaintiffs could be said to have argued 
for a different application of the FOTM theory to manipulation claims-just as Judge 
O'Scannlain speculated was possible. 
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V. OUT OF THE MUDDLE: A ''LOSS CAUSATION" REQUIREMENT 
As Desai and !PO demonstrate, courts are likely to see increasing 
numbers of plaintiffs seeking to avoid the Catch-22 of the efficient 
market requirement-requiring both a showing of manipulation and 
a showing that a manipulation could not have succeeded-by urging 
a reconception of the FOTM doctrine in market manipulation 
cases.278 The arguments they make are likely to resemble those 
made in the dying stages of Desai and JPO-that plaintiffs making 
market manipulation claims should be granted a presumption that 
they reasonably relied on the "integrity" of the market. In dealing 
with these arguments, courts will eventually have to do better than 
"we are chary."279 
The best solution would be to replace the requirement that 
plaintiffs demonstrate market efficiency with a requirement that 
they demonstrate market impact-that is, loss causation. It is the 
loss causation link in the chain of indirect reliance that is missing 
in manipulation cases; plaintiffs should be required to supply it to 
gain class certification. 
Courts have other options, but none are as appealing. First, they 
could-like the Desai majority-reject such arguments wholesale in 
favor of the status quo requirement of an efficient market for all 
lOb-5 claims. As should be clear at this point, the status quo is 
untenable. 280 Unlike misrepresentations, it is not a matter of 
"common sense and probability"281 that trading manipulations will 
affect the price of stocks traded in efficient markets. Instead, the 
efficient market requirement filters out plausible claims, while 
posing little obstacle to class certification for implausible claims. In 
performing this topsy-turvy filtering, the "efficient market" re-
quirement is not even "efficient" with respect to litigation costs. 
278. See, for example, In re Citigroup Auction Rate Securities Litigation, 700 F. Supp. 2d 
294, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), in which plaintiffs alleging market manipulation explicitly 
acknowledged lack of market efficiency and sought to rely "upon the integrity of the market" 
for the defendant's shares. 
279. Desai, 573 F.3d at 942 (per curiam). 
280. See supra Part IV. 
281. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). 
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Alternatively, the courts could embrace the Desai plaintiffs' 
"integrity of the market" theory with open arms, allowing a 
presumption of reliance without any showing at all.282 From a 
strictly theoretical point of view, this approach may make the most 
sense. 283 Despite its theoretical appeal, however, powerful practical 
282. Desai, 573 F.3d at 942. 
283. Recall that Fischel originally argued that, even for misrepresentations, "[t]he logic of 
the fraud on the market theory dictates that the reliance requirement as conventionally 
interpreted be discarded altogether." Fischel, supra note 56, at 11. This is especially so in 
market manipulation cases, in which even Basic's story of indirect reliance is 
incoherent-when the manipulation distorts prices directly through liquidity and demand 
pressures, nobody can be said to have "relied" on false information at all in the conventional 
sense. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202. 
Likewise, Judge O'ScaD..nlain's concern-that such a rule "would permit a presumption of 
reliance no matter how unlikely it is that the market price in question would actually reflect 
the alleged manipulation''-may be technically accurate, but theoretically misplaced in the 
context of the class certification decision. Desai, 573 F.3d at 945 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring). 
After all, in order to ultimately prevail at trial, plaintiffs would eventually have to show that 
prices were actually affected. But at class certification, the relevant question is not whether 
loss causation-and thus, indirectly, reliance--can be established. The relevant question is 
whether, if loss causation-and thus, indirectly, reliance--can in the end be established, it 
will be through common proof. Where the loss is allegedly caused by changes in market prices, 
loss causation can almost always be established through common proof. 
Furthermore, the theoretical concern about the FOTM presumption raised by Mahoney is 
less pressing in the market manipulation context. Briefly, Mahoney argues that the purpose 
of a reliance requirement is to minimize the social costs of fraud, which are primarily 
precaution costs-society believes it is cheaper to protect investors against misrepresentations 
ex post by first requiring them to rely and then allowing them to recover via securities fraud 
claims, rather than requiring them to protect themselves against misrepresentations ex ante 
by independent investigation of the relevant information. See Mahoney, supra note 88, at 638-
39. Although Fischel appeared to assume that the primary effect of a presumption of reliance 
would be to induce "informed" traders to become "uninformed," Fischel, supra note 56, at 13, 
-thus saving unnecessary "precaution costs"-Mahoney argues that the primary effect would 
be to cause informed traders to engage in independent investigation, rather than to rely. 
Mahoney, supra note 88, at 640. After all, those who do not rely will be better off in the 
absence of a reliance requirement, although those who do rely will be worse off-they will 
have to share any 10b-5 recovery with those who did not rely. Thus, a presumption of reliance 
"does not reduce precautions-it reduces reliance, which is just the opposite of the purpose 
of fraud law." I d. 
This objection has far less force in the context of market manipulation claims. In 
manipulations carried out primarily through liquidity and demand effects, nobody has to 
"rely" on anything. In manipulations carried out primarily through information effects-in 
which the major effect on prices is achieved through other investors' credulous "price 
decoding'' of the manipulative trades, the analysis is more complex. See supra notes 183-85 
and accompanying text. The false "information"-a misleading price/volume "signal"-is, as 
a practical matter, instantly and costlessly available to investors. But this information cannot 
simply be "relied on" like a statement in a quarterly report. It must be interpreted by price 
decoding-a potentially costly and difficult undertaking. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 
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considerations weigh against such a !3ourse. First of all, eliminating 
the reliance element altogether-in deed, if not in word-would 
represent a clear break with an explicit holding of Basic.284 Second, 
it would remove entirely any gatekeeper to class certification when 
"[w]ith vanishingly rare exception, class certification sets the 
litigation on a path toward resolution by way of settlement, not full-
fledged testing of the plaintiffs' case by trial."285 
Some may argue that the gatekeeper problem is less pressing in 
the wake of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly. 286 In Twombly, the Court "retired" the old pleading 
standard-that a complaint may only be dismissed if it appears the 
plaintiff can prove "no set of facts" entitling her to relief-in favor 
of more stringent '"plausibility pleading,' in which the plaintiff is 
required to plead facts sufficient to suggest that the claim for relief 
is 'plausible."'287 Even under the new "plausibility" standard, how-
ever, courts are required to accept the pleaded facts as true for the 
purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 288 Thus, although 
Twombly requires that the facts as pleaded present a plausible 
claim for relief-a standard that should not present serious 
difficulty to skilled plaintiffs' lawyers-it does nothing to allow 
courts to consider the plausibility of the alleged facts themselves 
until after class action, when it is too late. 289 In practice, then, Judge 
105, at 572-79. 
If an investor "relies" on the price/volume signal-that is, assumes without investigation 
that the signal is not a manipulation-the investor may waste resources fruitlessly 
attempting to decode it. If the investor does not rely-that is investigates to determine 
whether the signal is a possible manipulation-he may realize the signal contains no real 
information, and not bother expending resources decoding it. Thus, the absence of a "reliance" 
requirement in manipulation cases may increase "precaution costs," but decrease the 
resources wasted on price decoding. 
284. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 ("[R]eliance is an element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action."). 
285. Nagareda, supra note 19, at 99. In practice, then, Judge O'Scannlain's concern, see 
supra text accompanying note 271, is well placed. 
286. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
287. Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the 
Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 1997, 2000, 2012 (2010). More 
recently, the Court has affirmed that this "plausibility" standard applies to all aspects of a 
complaint subject to Rule 8(a). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-53 (2009). 
288. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
289. Similarly, the pleading particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) and the 
PSLRA-although certainly increasing the legal skill necessary to bring a complaint that will 
survive a motion to dismiss--do little to provide courts with the ability to reject factually 
implausible claims prior to class certification. 
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O'Scannlain's concern is well-placed.290 The pure "integrity of the 
market" presumption put forward by the Desai plaintiffs would 
allow manipulation plaintiffs a free pass to class certification and 
settlement, without any assurance that the alleged manipulations 
actually affected prices.291 
The better solution is to allow plaintiffs-as a matter of juristic 
grace-an irrebuttable presumption that they relied on the "integ-
rity" of the market, but require them to connect that reliance to the 
manipulation by demonstrating market impact at the class certifica-
tion stage. This solution is tailored to the fact that, unlike in the 
case of a material misrepresentation, the ECMH cannot serve to 
establish-as a matter of "common sense and probability"292 -that 
market manipulations will affect stock prices. A showing of market 
impact, therefore, supplies the missing causal link between reliance 
and the manipulation. A requirement that this showing take place 
at the class certification stage also serves as a logical gatekeeper 
that actually pertains to the merits-blocking claims in which 
plaintiffs are unable to establish a link between the alleged 
manipulations and changes in prices, while allowing meritorious 
suits to progress beyond class certification to almost certain 
settlement. This is in contrast to the current gatekeeper-a showing 
of market efficiency-which screens out the most likely candidates 
for market manipulation but poses no obstacle to dubious claims.293 
Thus, the plaintiffs in IPO and Desai should have been required, in 
order to achieve class certification, to make a showing-supported 
by expert testimony-that the alleged manipulations did, in fact, 
affect prices in a manner that would harm the plaintiff class.294 
290. Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (O'Scannlain, J., 
concurring). 
291. By contrast, the traditional FOTM doctrine-coupled with the requirement of an 
efficient market-does provide at least some assurance of market impact in misrepresentation 
cases. To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege material misrepresentations. To 
gain class certification, they must demonstrate an efficient market. In an efficient market, of 
course, any material misinformation would be reflected in prices. 
292. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988). 
293. A requirement that plaintiffs show loss causation also goes far toward Fischel's 
original view that the only relevant question in 10b-5 claims is "whether the alleged 
[misconduct] ... caused the security to trade at an artificially high or low price." Fischel, supra 
note 56, at 7. 
294. In the typical FOTM misrepresentation case, the plaintiff usually demonstrates loss 
causation by showing an abnormal movement in the relevant stock price, relative to a broader 
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The key question, of course, is whether such a showing of loss 
causation is appropriate at the class certification stage. Interest-
ingly, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit in Oscar Private Equity 
Investment v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., recently announced a re-
quirement that plaintiffs in alllOb-5 suits-misrepresentation and 
manipulation alike-demonstrate loss causation at class certifica-
tion in order to benefit from the FOTM presumption.295 Commentary 
on the Oscar majority's reasoning has been skeptical,296 and courts 
outside the Fifth Circuit have not been receptive to the holding. 297 
Nonetheless, it is valuable to consider whether the majority's 
reasoning applies in manipulation cases, and whether the criticisms 
lose their force in this context. 
The Oscar majority notes that the "requirement [of a showing of 
loss causation] was not plucked from the air,"298 but rather was 
based on Basic's statement "that the presumption of reliance may 
be rebutted by '[a]ny showing that severs the link between the 
alleged misrepresentation and ... the price received (or paid) by the 
plaintiff."'299 Through an extremely lenient "any showing" standard 
of rebuttal, the Fifth Circuit has, as a practical matter, "required 
plaintiffs invoking the fraud on the market theory to demonstrate 
loss causation."300 
According to the majority, a showing of actual loss causation is 
required-as opposed to a generalized showing at class certification 
that loss causation can be established through common proof-
because actual loss causation is necessary to provide a causal 
connection between the plaintiffs' reliance and the defendants' 
misrepresentation. 301 A mere showing of"market efficiency" does not 
market index, that can be linked to the misrepresentation or subsequent disclosure. For 
market manipulation cases, the showing would be similar-an abnormal movement that can 
be linked to the alleged manipulative trades. For the most inefficient penny stocks, such a 
showing may be difficult, due to high volatility and lack of a stable "baseline" for the stock. 
Of course, this difficulty would have to be overcome in order to prevail on the merits-the only 
difference here is that the difficulty would have to be overcome to achieve class certification. 
295. 487 F.3d 261,269 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Greenbergv. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 
657, 665 (5th Cir. 2004). 
296. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 78, at 184-89. 
297. See, e.g., Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
298. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265. 
299. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988)). 
300. Id. 
301. I d. at 269 (noting that a more generalized showing "might" be appropriate "if loss 
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necessarily establish this causal link because the market could be 
"demonstrated efficient by the usual indicia," but still be "actually 
inefficient with respect to the particular type of information 
conveyed by the material misrepresentation."302 In sum, the Oscar 
majority was skeptical of the first prong of Basic's double presump-
tion-that material misrepresentations will necessarily be reflected 
in prices in efficient markets.303 
In addition to providing the necessary causal connection between 
reliance and the misrepresentation, the majority believed the loss 
causation showing must occur at class certification because, in 
modern litigation, class certification is the "signal event of the case," 
conferring "in terrorem power" on the plaintiffs and allowing them 
to force settlement. 304 The court noted that the 2003 amendments to 
Rule 23 strongly suggest that such decisions should be made in a 
rigorous fashion prior to class certification, even if the issues 
overlap with the merits. 305 What is more, the majority argued, a 
showing ofloss causation should not require extensive discovery, as 
the evidence will usually be "drawn from public data and public 
filings," and the court's findings will be ''largely an empirical 
judgment that can be made [at class certification] as well as later in 
the litigation."306 The majority's arguments in favor of a thoroughgo-
ing showing ofloss causation at class certification, then, take three 
forms. First, loss causation is necessary to establish a causal 
connection between reliance on the market price and the misrepre-
sentation, and market efficiency does not necessarily imply loss 
causation were only empirical proof of materiality, unmoored from the question of classwide 
reliance" but explaining "that the refutation of loss causation more appropriately relates to 
the element of reliance") (internal quotations omitted). 
302. ld. Alternatively, the misrepresentation would also not be reflected in the price if the 
market is actually strong-form efficient. ld. ("A second possible explanation for a 
misrepresentation's failure to move the market is that the market was strong-form efficient 
with respect to that type of information, i.e., due to insider trading, the [true information] was 
reflected by the stock price well before the ... corrective disclosure."). For a general discussion 
of strong-form efficiency, see supra note 65. 
303. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 264-65. 
304. ld. at 266-67. 
305. ld. at 267 ("These subtle changes [to Rule 23], as well as the less-subtle PSLRA, 
recognize that a district court's certification order often bestows upon plaintiffs extraordinary 
leverage, and its bite should dictate the process that precedes it."). 
306. ld. 
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causation.307 Second, the class certification decision is the "signal 
event" in securities litigation.308 Third, establishing loss causation 
should not require significant discovery. 309 
Of these, the first gains significantly in strength when applied to 
market manipulation cases, and the second remains the same, while 
the third loses some force. First, loss causation is positively required 
to establish a causal connection between reliance on the "integrity" 
of the market and the manipulation itself-market efficiency serves 
to sever such a connection, not create one. Second, class certification 
remains the "signal event" of the litigation, and the implications of 
Rule 23 and the PSLRA remain the same. Third, however, it is less 
likely a full empirical inquiry into loss causation can take place 
without at least some discovery as to the defendants' trading 
activities. Nonetheless, because the issue will be primarily empirical 
-did the defendants' trading materially affect market price?-the 
discovery can be fairly limited in scope and need not extend to 
knottier issues of scienter. 
The primary criticisms of the Oscar majority's reasoning are far 
less trenchant in the market manipulation context. The dissent by 
Judge Dennis in Oscar gives a good account of these objections.310 
The first objection is simply that requiring a showing of loss 
causation is inconsistent with Basic. 311 Basic adopted a presumption 
that material misrepresentations are reflected in the stock price,312 
and Judge Dennis claims Oscar, together with an earlier decision,. 
"improperly shifts the Basic burden, changing it from a defendant's 
right of rebuttal to a plaintiff's burden ofproo£."313 The result is that 
plaintiffs are "requir[ed] ... to prove, as a precondition to the appli-
cation of the presumption, the very facts that are to be presumed 
under Basic."314 
As we have discussed, the Basic Court was dealing with a misrep-
resentation case, and its rationales were fitted to such a context. 
The Court's key presumption-that false statements and material 
307. Id. at 265. 
308. Id. at 266. 
309. Id. at 267. 
310. Id. at 272 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
311. Jd. 
312. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988). 
313. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 274. 
314. Jd. 
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omissions will inflate or depress a stock's price315-simply does not 
apply, on its face, to trade-based manipulations. Requiring a 
showing of loss causation in market manipulation cases does not 
ignore or conflict with Basic's holdings, it merely adapts them to a 
different context. Indeed, this is one of the great attractions of the 
solutions proposed here-they require no legislative or even 
Supreme Court action to implement. Abandoning the requirement 
of a showing of market efficiency in favor of a showing of loss 
causation is perfectly consistent with the underlying statutory 
scheme, as well as the policies expressed in Rule 23 and the PSLRA. 
Nor would taking these steps require action by the Supreme 
Court-the Court has never confronted the issue of how the FOTM 
doctrine should be applied to market manipulation claims, and the 
proposals here are consistent with the reasoning of Basic. Circuit 
courts, and even most district courts, could begin applying these 
solutions immediately. 
Similarly, one may agree with Judge Dennis that actual loss 
causation-as opposed to a showing that loss causation can be 
established through common proof-is not necessary to find the 
requirements of Rule 23 met in misrepresentation cases, 316 yet not 
be as troubled by this in misrepresentation cases. Langevoort, for 
example, heavily criticizes the Oscar majority, yet has argued in the 
past that courts should focus on "whether the market as a whole 
was fooled"-that is, whether misrepresentations have actually 
affected the price.317 In a recent paper, Langevoort argued in 
addition that such an inquiry-akin to the loss causation showing 
advocated here-needed "to be an early-stage determination," made 
prior to class certification.318 In part, Langevoort is made comfort-
able with such an early-stage inquiry into loss causation because he 
believes that, rather than stemming from theories of market 
efficiency, "[t]he presumption of reliance is best thought of as an act 
of juristic grace, in the name of both fairness and efficiency. We 
need not follow it slavishly if there are doubts about either, much 
less both."319 As is argued earlier in this Article, a presumption of 
315. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244-45. 
316. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 278. 
317. Langevoort, Theories, supra note 189, at 904. 
318. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 196. 
319. Id. at 195. 
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reliance on the "integrity'' of the market in manipulation cases must 
be thought of as an act of "juristic grace."320 Such grace should not 
be bestowed unless there is some reason to believe it justified by 
"fairness and efficiency."321 Furthermore, requiring plaintiffs to 
establish loss causation at class certification is more appropriate, 
and more consistent with precedent, for manipulation cases than for 
misrepresentation cases. Thus, one may believe such a requirement 
inappropriate for misrepresentation cases and still find it appropri-
ate for manipulation cases. 
The only remaining question is whether there should be any role 
at all for market efficiency in manipulation cases. That is, should 
plaintiffs need to establish that the relevant market was in some 
limited sense "open and developed" in order to benefit from our 
normative presumption of reasonable reliance? Probably so, but not 
much turns on the answer, because the showing should necessarily 
not be particularly demanding. Mter all, if it were too demanding 
we would be right back where we started-weeding out plausible 
claims of manipulation while allowing implausible claims a free 
pass. At most, plaintiffs should simply be required to make a 
cursory showing that the market possessed some of the general 
indicia of efficiency embodied in the Cammer factors. 322 The purpose 
of such a showing is twofold. First, it would preserve some sense of 
reasonableness in the idea of "reasonable" reliance. Mter all, "[w]e 
want investors to act with some diligence, and blind reliance should 
not be rewarded. Investors who buy or sell thinly traded stocks 
should not be assuming much of anything."323 Second, reliance on 
the integrity of patently inefficient markets arguably constitutes 
recklessness, which normally bars recovery under lOb-5.324 
320. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. 
321. Others have made similar arguments in favor of requiring a showing of loss causation 
at class certification for all10b-5 claims. See Oldham, supra note 43, at 1003. More generally, 
Judge Posner has suggested that it would be desirable for judges to "make a preliminary 
examination of the merits of the suit and to refuse to certify it as a class action unless 
satisfied that the suit has a reasonable chance of succeeding on the merits." RICHARD A 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHAlLENGE AND REFORM 344 (1996). 
322. See supra note 92. Of course, even this undemanding showing may rule out otherwise 
meritorious class actions in some small penny stocks like the one mentioned in the 
Introduction. It may be that such cases are best dealt with through individual litigation and 
SEC enforcement actions. 
323. Langevoort, supra note 78, at 171. 
324. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 1 Ob-5: Should 
1180 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1111 
CONCLUSION 
The traditional requirement for gaining the benefit of the FOTM 
presumption of reliance-a showing of market efficiency-should be 
abandoned in market manipulation cases. The rationales for the 
market efficiency requirement, although defensible in the context 
of misrepresentation claims, are inapplicable to manipulation 
claims. Market efficiency simply does nothing to suggest a causal 
connection between reliance on the market price and manipulative 
conduct. Indeed, market efficiency tends to sever this connection, 
and the requirement of market efficiency leads to perverse results 
in actual litigation. 
Instead, plaintiffs alleging market manipulation should be 
presumed to rely on the integrity of even minimally efficient 
markets, but be required to establish loss causation at the class 
certification stage in order to link this reliance to the alleged 
manipulation. Such a requirement would serve as a logical and 
effective gatekeeper to class certification without doing violence to 
Supreme Court precedent. 
Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 113 (1985). 
